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INTRODUCTION 
The State of Texas is known as the capital of capital 
punishment.1 But is that reputation deserved? In a way, yes. Texas 
sends more people to death row than any other state, and it executes 
them far faster.2 However, in another way, it is incorrect to suggest 
that “the State” of Texas is a prolific user of capital punishment. 
Death penalty cases are prosecuted by counties, not the state, and a 
majority of Texas’s counties have never imposed the death penalty.3 In 
fact, only a handful of Texas’s 254 counties regularly seek the death 
 
 1. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (2007) (noting that, in 
2000, “Texas was the undisputed capital of capital punishment among the states”).   
 2. See id. at 46 (noting that, in six years, Bush signed more death warrants than any other 
governor in the last twenty-five years); see also Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking 
Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1 (noting that, in 2007, over half of the nation’s 
executions took place in Texas, in part because prosecutors, courts, the pardon board, and the 
governor all pushed for expeditious executions). 
 3. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO 
DEATH FROM EACH COUNTY, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countysentenced.htm (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS] (listing number of death 
sentences imposed by each county in Texas). 
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penalty.4 Many other states have a similarly disproportionate 
utilization of capital punishment among their counties.5  
The uneven use of the death penalty across the nation leads to 
serious problems. Perhaps most obviously, the counties6 that often 
seek the death penalty sometimes choose borderline cases and try 
them very aggressively in order to win death sentences.7 
Subsequently, many of these cases are reversed on appeal or, worse 
yet, result in controversial executions that raise serious questions 
about the culpability of the inmate and provide fodder for critics of 
capital punishment.8 This criticism tends to fall on the entire state, 
rather than on the county that prosecuted the case.9  
 
 4. Id.; see also Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L. 
REV. 369, 374 (2008) (“More people sentenced to death in Harris County have been executed than 
from any state except Texas itself.”). 
 5. Examples abound. In Pennsylvania, the vast majority of death sentences come from 
Philadelphia County, while comparably sized Pittsburgh sends few people to death row. See Tina 
Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 16, 1995, at 22 (observing that of 
Pennsylvania’s 194 death row inmates, 105, or 55 percent, were sentenced in Philadelphia, 
where prosecutors seek the death penalty far more frequently than in Pittsburg). In Maryland, a 
study found that Baltimore County murderers were fourteen times more likely to be sentenced to 
death than those convicted in Montgomery County. See Ray Paternoster, Misunderstandings 
Cloud Death Penalty Findings, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 2005, at A19 (“Defendants who killed their 
victims in Baltimore County were . . . nearly 14 times more likely [to be sentenced to death] than 
if they lived in Montgomery county . . . .”). See infra notes 51–60 and accompanying text 
(providing additional examples).  
 6. Not all states utilize a county-based death penalty system. In a handful of smaller 
states, the state attorney general’s office, rather than individual counties, handles capital cases. 
See, e.g., Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty Out in Guard Killing; Inmates’ Defense Fund Fell Short, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at C1 (noting that the State Supreme Court dismissed capital 
charges because the Attorney General’s Office was unable to procure sufficient funding for 
capital defense lawyers). 
 7. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 
104–05 (2007) (arguing that the current system allows prosecutors to seek capital punishment in 
“borderline cases”). 
 8. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH 
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT iv (2002) (“The more often states 
succumb to pressures to inflict capital sentences in marginal cases, the higher is the risk of error 
and delay, the lower is the chance verdicts will be carried out, and the greater is the temptation 
to approve flawed verdicts on appeal.”). Recently, consider the case of Troy Davis which caused 
international headlines due to questions of his innocence. Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook, Court 
Issues Stay, Lets Davis Make his Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 25, 2008, at A1.  
 9. In Texas, at least, it is quite common to hear Texas executions referred to as 
“Texecutions.” See, e.g., Thom Marshall, Jury Room Camera Could Help System, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Dec. 7, 2002, at A33 (“Harris County is widely known for handing down more death 
penalties than any other county, in the state that executes more people than any other state in 
the Union. Texas does about one-third the total number of executions carried out in the United 
States. I recently heard a fellow refer to them as ‘Texecutions.’ ”). No one speaks of a “Houst-
ecution,” or a “Dall-ecution.” 
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On the other hand, the under-utilization of the death penalty 
in many counties is equally troubling. Because the death penalty is 
heavily regulated, it is very expensive to prosecute capital cases.10 
Many small counties faced with heinous crimes do not seek the death 
penalty because they simply cannot afford to do so.11 And when 
infrequent users of the death penalty do try capital cases, they often 
lack the experience to comply with the highly technical rules that 
govern such cases.12 This inexperience results in death sentences 
being overturned on appeal years later.13 Those cases are often 
subsequently retried at great expense14 to the counties that handle the 
trials and the states that typically handle the appeals.15 
In sum, other than the value of regional autonomy, there is 
little to commend regarding county control of capital cases. This 
Article therefore offers a roadmap for cutting counties out of the death 
penalty system. All aspects of death penalty cases—charging, trial, 
appeal, and everything in between—can and should be handled at the 
state level by an elite group of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
judges whose sole responsibility is to deal with capital cases. These 
elite lawyers should be selected through a careful vetting process that 
considers experience, reversal rates, and clean ethics records. 
 
 10. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Brenda Goodwin, Capital Cases Stall as Costs Grow 
Daunting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007 (noting that the costs of prosecuting the Atlanta courthouse 
shooter had topped $1.2 million before the trial even began); Kevin Landrigan, Taxpayers Could 
Be Out $2M for Capital Cases, NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2008 (discussing the high cost of 
two pending capital murder cases). For a recent editorial suggesting that costs should never be a 
factor in deciding whether to seek the death penalty, see Editorial, Money Has No Place in Death 
Penalty Debate, STAR PRESS, Sept. 21, 2008, at 2D. For commentary asserting the foolishness of 
saying money has no place in such decisions, see Douglas A. Berman, Does Money Have No Place 
In Any Life/Death Debate?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y, Sept. 21, 2008, http://sentencing. 
typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/09/does-money-have.html#comments (quoting and 
criticizing the above editorial from The Star Press).  
 11. See discussion infra Part I.C.  
 12. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.  
 13. There is an expression among prosecutors that they are “in the business of sales, not 
warranties.” 
 14. Consider the case of John Paul Penry who was sentenced to death three separate times, 
each of which was reversed on appeal. Penry was on death row in Texas for twenty-eight years 
before the district attorney agreed to a plea deal with a life sentence. Mike Tolson, An End to a 
Legal Saga: Deal Keeps Penry Imprisoned for Life: Inmate Who Had Death Sentence Overturned 
Three Times Apologizes, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 16, 2008, at B1. Experts speculate that the 
effort to execute Penry cost tens or perhaps even hundreds of millions of dollars. See Douglas A. 
Berman, Wondering About Death and Dollars in Ohio, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y, Feb. 18, 2008, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/02/wondering-about.html 
(estimating that Penry’s defense may have cost as much as one billion dollars).  
 15. Although counties usually pay for trials, many states pick up the tab for appeals. Adam 
M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to 
Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 891 (2007). 
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Although these lawyers and judges will be drawn from counties 
throughout the states, they should be paid by the states in order to 
reduce the pervasive funding problem that currently hinders the 
entire death penalty system.16  
Such a statewide system will cost a substantial amount of 
money ex ante. In the long run, however, a statewide approach will 
cut costs by eliminating some of the appellate issues that are litigated 
at enormous expense for years after trial. For instance, the typical 
capital appeal almost always raises claims that prosecutors hid 
favorable evidence and that the defendant’s lawyer was ineffective.17 
With an elite statewide unit of capital prosecutors and defense 
lawyers, appellate judges would likely face far fewer legitimate claims 
of this type and would be able to dispose of such frivolous claims much 
faster. An elite team of lawyers would be more likely to comply with 
the law, thus avoiding not only reversals but also the costly retrials 
and subsequent appeals following a second death sentence. 
Moreover, a statewide approach would go a long way toward 
eliminating the geographic arbitrariness of the death penalty within 
death penalty states. Wealthy counties will find it hard to convince 
prosecutors based out of other jurisdictions to seek the death penalty 
in borderline cases. Poor counties that previously lacked the funds to 
seek death for heinous crimes will have a chance to have their cases 
considered on the merits and without regard to costs. 
Finally, staffing the death penalty system with elite 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges will help to restore 
confidence in both the overall system and individual verdicts. Critics 
of capital punishment will find it much harder to point their fingers at 
overzealous prosecutors or criticize the pervasive problem of under-
funded or inadequate defense counsel that currently exists in 
numerous jurisdictions throughout the country.18 Providing elite 
 
 16. See David McCord, Lightning Strikes: Evidence from the Popular Press that Death 
Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three Decades After Furman, 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 797, 822–23 (2005) (“In only two jurisdictions does an official with 
jurisdiction-wide authority make death penalty decisions . . . These disparities are exacerbated 
by the fact that funding of prosecutors’ offices is also largely at the county level . . . Likewise, 
funding for indigent defense in death cases is also often at the county level . . . .”). 
 17. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in 
Capital Cases in the Fourth Circuit, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1108 n.5 (2006) (“The three most 
common species of claims in capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson 
claims, and Brady claims.”); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 131 (2007) (“Brady violations are among the most common forms of 
prosecutorial misconduct.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime, But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor people accused of 
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defense lawyers also will lead to more accurate results at trial, thus 
reducing wrongful convictions that have remained all too common in 
the modern death penalty era.19 
Part I of this Article reviews the serious defects present in 
county-centered death penalty systems. In particular, Part I focuses 
on the variations in capital charging between counties, the 
underfunding of county-based indigent defense systems, and the 
problems caused by inadequate judges. Part II then articulates how a 
statewide death penalty system could be created to eliminate counties’ 
involvement. Part II describes a selection process that would ensure 
the best prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges from around the 
state. Part II also explains how the formation of an elite prosecution 
unit would transform capital charging from a solitary and potentially 
arbitrary exercise into a more consistent committee-based decision. 
Part III then details how a statewide capital punishment framework 
would depoliticize the death penalty and provide for long-term cost 
savings. 
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH COUNTY-CONTROLLED CAPITAL CASES 
A. Differentiating State Arbitrariness from County Arbitrariness 
Critics have long complained about the geographic 
arbitrariness of the death penalty. It is almost trite for observers to 
lament how Texas is the capital of capital punishment while other 
states either do not authorize the death penalty or have it in name 
only. At first blush, it is troubling that a defendant has a dramatically 
greater chance of receiving the death penalty in Texas or other 
southern states than he would in other parts of the country.20 Yet 
variations between states can be explained as a matter of federalism.21 
 
capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skill, resources, and commitment to 
handle such serious matters.”). 
 19. There have been 133 exonerations of death row inmates since the Supreme Court 
reinstated capital punishment in 1976. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 
31, 2010) (listing number of exonerations by year). 
 20. I have raised this argument previously. Gershowitz, supra note 7, at 90–91.   
 21. See Andrew Ditchfield, Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of 
Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801, 805 (2007) (“Reference to sovereignty rights 
supports interstate variations in the application of the death penalty, but it does not support 
variations in the application of a capital punishment statute among different legal jurisdictions 
within the same state.”). 
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As a sovereign state, Texas has the prerogative to use the death 
penalty frequently22 even though other states seek it rarely.23 
Federalism, however, cannot explain the wide variations 
between counties in the same state.24 After all, if a sovereign state has 
made the decision to authorize capital punishment and enact statutes 
designed to vigorously pursue the death penalty, what justification is 
there for the difference between life and death to depend on what side 
of the county line a criminal commits his offense?25 While it is true 
that county citizens typically have the power to elect their own district 
attorneys rather than accept officials appointed by the state, those 
prosecutors act on behalf of the state, not the county, in criminal 
cases. 
Moreover, all county prosecutors are obligated to enforce the 
same state law. While every criminal statute necessarily leaves some 
room for interpretation at the margins, the Supreme Court has been 
firm about the need for death penalty statutes to be clear and capable 
of consistent application.26 For instance, the Court has demanded that 
the statutory aggravating factors making a defendant death eligible 
be narrowly tailored so as to separate death-worthy cases from 
ordinary murders.27 Such a requirement is seemingly inconsistent 
with a framework that gives prosecutors in different parts of a state 
great discretion to utilize the same statute in opposite fashions. 
 
 22. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2005) (observing and lamenting how 
decentralized criminal justice encourages jurisdictions to harshen their criminal laws in order to 
drive criminals to other jurisdictions). 
 23. For instance, Colorado has executed one person since 1976 and presently has only three 
people on death row awaiting execution. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (click on Colorado using the map or drop-down 
menu) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 24. Ditchfield, supra note 21, at 805. 
 25. Counties are not treated as separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes. See 
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970) (forbidding a second trial by state prosecutors after 
defendant was first prosecuted for the same offense by county prosecutors). 
 26. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment 
Law, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 47, 57–59 (James R. Acker et al. 
eds., 1998) (discussing the Court’s “narrowing” doctrine). But see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital 
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 364–68 (1998) (arguing that the Court has 
not followed through on its demand for narrow aggravating factors). 
 27. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 359–60 (1988) (holding unconstitutionally 
vague under the Eighth Amendment the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating 
circumstance of the Oklahoma death penalty statute because it did not provide sufficient 
guidance for the jury to impose the death penalty); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) 
(reversing the petitioner’s death sentence because there was “no principled way to distinguish 
this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not”).  
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Counties’ autonomy to prosecute cases as they see fit is so 
tenuous that some states even have statutes authorizing state officials 
to wrestle cases away from county prosecutors.28 For instance, when 
the Bronx County District Attorney declined to seek the death penalty 
in a high-profile case, the Governor of New York accused him of 
refusing to enforce state law.29 The Governor turned the case over to 
the state attorney general, who subsequently filed a notice to seek the 
death penalty.30 Some states have gone even further and abolished 
county prosecution units altogether.31 Indeed, states actually have the 
authority to abolish the counties themselves if they so desire.32 There 
seems little justification to tolerate arbitrariness in the application of 
the death penalty between counties of the same state. Yet that is 
exactly what happens throughout the United States. 
B. Wide Disparities in Application of the Death Penalty Within States 
While state legislatures authorize capital punishment and 
draft the statutes under which it will be imposed, actual enforcement 
typically falls to county prosecutors. And within individual states, 
counties often have vastly different practices in determining whether 
to seek the death penalty. 
The widest variations between counties’ use of the death 
penalty appear to exist in Pennsylvania. Although Pennsylvania has 
only carried out three executions since it reenacted its death penalty 
 
 28. See John A. Horowitz, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a 
Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571, 2587–92 
(1997) (discussing how local district attorneys in California and Colorado are supervised by their 
states’ attorneys general and how the attorneys general have supersedure power to remove cases 
from the local prosecutors). 
 29. See id. at 2582–84 (recounting Governor Pataki’s removal of District Attorney Johnson’s 
discretion to seek the death penalty in the Diaz case). 
 30. Id. 
 31. In Delaware and Rhode Island, for instance, the state attorney general’s office, rather 
than county prosecutors, handle all of the states’ criminal cases. Delaware Attorney General, 
Divisions & Units: Criminal Division, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/office/criminal.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010); State of Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Civil and 
Criminal Division, http://www.riag.state.ri.us/civilcriminal/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). Rhode 
Island does not authorize capital punishment. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE 
DATABASE, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (click on Rhode Island using the map 
or drop-down menu) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
 32. See Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 
HOUSTON L. REV. 289, 302 (1997) (recounting how the State of Alabama adopted a constitutional 
amendment in the 1950s to abolish Macon County “if necessary” to prevent blacks from voting). 
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in 1974,33 it presently has 223 inmates on death row.34 Roughly half of 
those inmates—106—came from Philadelphia County,35 where the 
longtime district attorney36 has said that she seeks the death penalty 
as often as possible.37 Although Philadelphia County accounts for 
about 10 percent of Pennsylvania’s population, it is responsible for 48 
percent of inmates on death row. By contrast, Allegheny County, 
which includes Pittsburgh and has a nearly identical population, has 
only eleven inmates on death row. The following table illustrates how 
Philadelphia County is a striking outlier in Pennsylvania in regards to 
capital punishment:  
 
Jurisdiction People Sent 
to Death 
Row38 
Population
39 
Percentage of 
Total State 
Population 
Percentage 
of Death 
Row 
Entire State of 
Pennsylvania 
223 12,448,279 100% 100% 
Philadelphia 
County, PA 
106 1,447,395 12% 48% 
Allegheny 
County, PA 
10 1,215,103 10% 4% 
 
Texas likewise has wide variations in its counties’ application 
of capital punishment. Between 1976, when the Supreme Court 
 
 33. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org 
/state_by_state (click on Pennsylvania using the map or drop-down menu) (last visited Jan. 31, 
2010). 
 34. See PA. DEP’T OF CORR., PERSONS SENTENCED TO EXECUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA AS OF 
NOVEMBER 2, 2009, available at http://www.cor.state.pa.us/portal/lib/portal/Execution_List.pdf 
[hereinafter PDC, PERSONS SENTENCED]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Lynne Abraham has served as Philadelphia County District Attorney since 1991. City of 
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, Meet the District Attorney, http://www. 
phila.gov/districtattorney/AboutUs/meetTheDA.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
 37. See Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 22 (“Abraham’s office seeks death virtually as often as 
the law will allow.”); see also William C. Smith, A Tale of Two Cities, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 
15, 1997, at 1 (explaining that the difference is due in part to the higher murder rate in 
Philadelphia but in greater part to the fact that the “Philadelphia D.A.’s office is much more 
aggressive in seeking the death penalty”). 
 38. PDC, PERSONS SENTENCED, supra note 34.  
 39. All populations are taken from the estimated 2008 Census. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: PENNSYLVANIA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
42000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (follow “Allegheny” or “Philadelphia” hyperlink under 
“Pennsylvania counties”). 
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reinstated capital punishment,40 and December 2008, Texas sent over 
a thousand inmates to death row.41 Remarkably, even though Texas 
has 254 counties, a single county accounted for 280 of the death-
sentenced inmates.42 Harris County, which is home to the nation’s 
fourth-largest city (Houston), accounts for 16 percent of Texas’s 
population, but 28 percent of its death sentences.43 When three 
additional counties—Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant—are added to Harris 
County, those four localities account for 51 percent of Texas’s death 
sentences, but only 40 percent of its population.44 Adding the death 
sentences from fourteen additional counties accounts for roughly 75 
percent of Texas’s total death sentences.45 By contrast, there are more 
than 130 Texas counties that have never sent an inmate to death row 
in the last three decades.46 
In Maryland, the city of Baltimore has a high crime rate but 
rarely seeks the death penalty.47 By contrast, neighboring Baltimore 
County, which is a separate jurisdiction with dramatically fewer 
homicides, seeks the death penalty with much greater frequency.48 
One study found that murder defendants in Baltimore County were 
 
 40. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the punishment of 
death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”). 
 41. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing 1,004 offenders 
sentenced to death as of December 31, 2008). Of course, many of these death sentences were 
reversed and did not result in executions. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48201.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). Although 
revealing, these numbers do not tell the full story. For many years, Harris County sought the 
death penalty so aggressively that it had a comparatively low success rate at trial. For instance, 
in 1999, prosecutors only won death sentences in 53 percent of the cases where they sought 
death. See Mary Flood, What Price Justice?: Gary Graham Case Fuels Debate Over Appointed 
Attorneys, HOUSTON CHRON., July 1, 2000, at A1. A Houston Chronicle study found that during 
the 1980s and 1990s, Dallas County prosecutors won death sentences in 94 percent of the cases 
in which it was sought compared with 75 percent in Harris County. See Mike Tolson, A Deadly 
Distinction: Harris County Is a Pipeline to Death Row, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at A1. In 
2008, for the first time in three decades, Harris County did not sentence a single defendant to 
death. Michael Graczyk, Texas Sentences 9 To Die in ’08, Fewest in Decades, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 
4, 2008. 
 44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: TEXAS, http://quickfacts.census. 
gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (follow “Bexar,” “Dallas,” “Harris,” or 
“Tarrant” hyperlink under “Texas counties”). 
 45. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing Texas death penalties 
by county). The fourteen additional counties are: Bowie, Brazos, Cameron, Collin, El Paso, 
Hidalgo, Jefferson, Lubbock, McLennan, Montgomery, Nueces, Potter, Smith, and Travis. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See Lori Montgomery, Md. Questioning Local Extremes on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, 
May 12, 2002, at C1 (indicating that Baltimore seeks the death penalty infrequently). 
 48. See id. (comparing Baltimore and Baltimore County).  
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twenty-three times more likely to be sentenced to death than in 
Baltimore City.49 The same study also found that Baltimore County 
prosecutors sought the death penalty far more often than prosecutors 
in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County, both of which are 
only a short drive from Baltimore.50 
Before New York’s highest court held that state’s death penalty 
statute unconstitutional,51 prosecutors from upstate counties sought 
the death penalty “aggressively.”52 Although upstate jurisdictions 
accounted for only 20 percent of New York’s murders, they accounted 
for 65 percent of the state’s capital prosecutions.53 By contrast, 
prosecutors in New York City rarely sought the death penalty; the 
Bronx District Attorney refused to seek it at all.54 
In Ohio, the Hamilton County District Attorney’s Office (based 
out of Cincinnati) has pursued the death penalty more aggressively 
than the Franklin County District Attorney’s Office (which includes 
the larger city of Columbus).55 Even though Franklin County has 
200,000 more residents than Hamilton County,56 it had only one-third 
as many inmates on death row as of December 2008.57  
In Tennessee, the Davidson County District Attorney’s Office 
(which is home to Nashville) seeks the death penalty less often than 
the Shelby County District Attorney’s Office (which includes the city 
of Memphis).58 There are three times as many inmates on death row 
 
 49. Paternoster, supra note 5, at A19.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 361 (N.Y. 2004) (holding jury instruction 
unconstitutional). 
 52. Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors: A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at 27. 
 53. THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK STATE: STATISTICS 
FROM EIGHT YEARS OF REPRESENTATION (2003), available at http://www.nycdo.org/8yr.html. 
 54. See Nossiter, supra note 52 (noting the Bronx District Attorney’s intention not to seek 
the death penalty after New York’s 1995 statute took effect). 
 55. See Richard Willing & Gary Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty, USA TODAY, Dec. 
20, 1999, at A1 (recounting the Ohio disparity, as well as variations in other states). 
 56. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: FRANKLIN COUNTY, 
OHIO (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39049.html (listing the population of 
Franklin County), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: HAMILTON 
COUNTY, OHIO (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39061.html (listing the 
population of Hamilton County). 
 57. See Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Death Row Inmates, 
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/Public/deathrow.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (including a list of 
inmates indicating that there were thirty-six from Hamilton County and twelve from Franklin 
County). 
 58. See John M. Scheb II, William Lyons & Kristin A. Wagers, Race, Prosecutors and Juries: 
The Death Penalty in Tennessee, 29 JUST. SYST. J. 338, 345 (2008) (“In Shelby County, which 
contains Memphis, prosecutors sought the death penalty 52 percent of the time, while in 
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from Shelby County than there are from Davidson County,59 despite 
the fact that the former has only a 44 percent greater general 
population than the latter.60 
As these and other61 examples indicate, throughout the country 
there are wide variations in the use of the death penalty between 
counties of the same state. 
C. Explaining the Discrepancies between Counties 
At the outset, I should be clear that I do not mean to suggest 
that the district attorneys who frequently seek the death penalty are 
bloodthirsty, nor that those who use it sparingly are soft on crime. 
One county might use the death penalty more frequently because its 
chief prosecutor genuinely believes it is merited.62 There are also 
obvious differences in crime rates between different counties of the 
same state, even if they are comparably sized.63 In Pennsylvania, 
Allegheny County is nearly as populated as Philadelphia County, yet 
the latter has more than four times as many murders in an average 
year.64 
Still, even when considering varying crime rates and legitimate 
differences of opinion as to which crimes are worthy of death, it is 
hard to explain the wide variations in counties’ use of the death 
penalty. Are there really ten times as many death-eligible murders in 
Philadelphia County as there are in Allegheny County? Are there 
 
Davidson County (Nashville) prosecutors pursued capital punishment only 12 percent of the 
time.”). 
 59. See Tennessee Department of Corrections, Death Row Facts, http://www.tennessee. 
gov/correction/deathfacts.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (indicating that there are thirty-six 
inmates on death row from Shelby County and eleven from Davidson County). 
 60. The most recent estimates were that Davidson County’s population was 626,144 and 
Shelby County’s population was 906,825. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: 
DAVISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47/47037.html; U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE (2009), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47/47157.html. 
 61. See, e.g., Joseph R. McCarthy, Note, Implications of County Variance in New Jersey 
Capital Murder Cases: Arbitrary Decision-Making by County Prosecutors, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 969, 980–83 (reviewing variations in New Jersey, Nebraska, and Virginia).  
 62. See Anthony Neddo, Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging the Death Penalty: Opening 
the Doors to Arbitrary Decisionmaking in New York Capital Cases, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1949, 1950 
(1997) (“[C]harging the death penalty may depend on arbitrary decisionmaking processes 
reflective of an individual prosecutor’s moral or ideological position on the death penalty, or on 
his or her notion of justice.”). 
 63. See supra notes 34–38 (detailing the difference between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh).  
 64. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 374–75 (14th ed. 2007).  
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three times as many heinous murders committed in Houston as there 
are in Dallas?65 
An alternate and more plausible explanation for much of the 
variation in some counties is money. While prosecutors regularly 
make public statements that they do not consider costs in deciding 
whether to seek the death penalty,66 it is unlikely that they are 
completely blind to financial concerns.67 Larger counties typically have 
larger budgets and can afford to prosecute more capital cases.68 By 
contrast, prosecutors69 in smaller counties, or counties facing very 
tight budgets, must look beyond the merits of the case to determine 
whether they can afford the enormous costs of capital litigation.70 
For instance, prosecutors in Shelby County, Texas, which has a 
population of less than thirty thousand people,71 recently decided not 
to seek the death penalty for a defendant who was accused of three 
 
 65. Harris County has sent nearly three times as many defendants to death row as Dallas 
County. See TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3 (listing the number of murders 
committed in Houston and Dallas). 
 66. See, e.g., Prosecutor: Death Penalty Hinges on Justice, Not Money, SEATTLE TIMES, June 
19, 2000, at B2 (“Spokane County Prosecutor Steve Tucker says money won’t be a factor in his 
decision whether to pursue the death penalty against Robert Yates Jr. in eight serial killings. 
‘It’s about seeking justice. Money won’t or shouldn’t play into it at all,’ Tucker said last week.”). 
 67. See Amanda S. Hitchcock, Comment, Using the Adversarial Process to Limit 
Arbitrariness in Capital Charging Decisions, 85 N.C. L. REV. 931, 951 (2007) (“Prosecutors 
cannot simply ignore these [cost] realities”); see also Berman, supra note 14 (arguing that costs 
are a relevant consideration). 
 68. See Steve Brewer, A Deadly Distinction; County Has Budget to Prosecute with a 
Vengeance; District Attorney's Office Focuses on Capital Cases, and Commissioners Court Backs 
Up the Approach, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001 (quoting a state district judge as saying that 
“one of the reasons Harris County tries so many capital murder cases is simple economics – we 
can afford to”). 
 69. In one case, a judge actually forbade prosecutors from seeking the death penalty 
because the cost of providing an adequate defense would bankrupt the county which had a 
population of less than 13,000 people. Recognizing that such a ruling was impermissible, the 
judge quickly reversed course. See Judge Changes Mind on Murder Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2002, § 1, at 22 (discussing the judge’s reversal). 
 70. Factoring in financial considerations is not limited to capital cases. District attorneys 
are forced to take into account financial considerations every day in virtually every facet of their 
office policies. For example, as Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz have explained, state prosecutors 
rarely pursue high-end white-collar crime because the investigation necessary to win such cases 
is too expensive. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 601–02 (2005) 
(discussing why only federal district attorneys can afford the high cost of pursuing certain 
investigations). It would be surprising if it were any different with respect to capital cases.  
 71. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION FINDER: SHELBY COUNTY, TEXAS, http://www. 
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?geo_id=05000US48419&_state=04000US48&pctxt
=cr (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (listing the population for Shelby County, Texas in 2008 as 
26,529). 
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separate murders and had already confessed to two of them.72 Shelby 
County has sent only one person to death row in the last thirty 
years.73 The County’s elected district attorney said that the defendant 
deserved the death penalty, but she ultimately agreed to a 
punishment of three life sentences because of “limited resources for a 
death penalty prosecution.”74  
In Pike County, Indiana (population thirteen thousand),75 
prosecutors declined to seek the death penalty for three men who 
kidnapped a woman and drove over her body up to thirty times while 
she was still alive.76 The victim’s mother claimed that the prosecutor 
told her the county could not seek the death penalty because it was too 
expensive, though the prosecutor denies making this statement.77 A 
similar allegation was made in Greene County, Indiana (population 
thirty-three thousand),78 where the family of a mentally disabled 
woman who was raped, tortured, and murdered79 claimed cost 
prohibited the prosecutor from seeking death.80 Once again, the 
prosecutor denied considering costs.81 Although it is impossible to say 
for certain that the prosecutors from these two small Indiana counties 
were lying about not considering costs, it would make logical sense for 
them to make that very calculation. Prosecutors from Indiana’s largest 
county (Marion County) have estimated that death penalty trials in 
that state require the resources of five “normal” murder cases.82 
Other prosecutors from across the country have grudgingly 
acknowledged that costs play into decisions to seek the death penalty. 
 
 72. Matthew Stoff, After Confession, Smith Sentenced to Three Life Terms, DAILY SENTINEL, 
Apr. 3, 2008. 
 73. TDCJ, TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENDERS, supra note 3. 
 74. Stoff, supra note 72. 
 75. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: PIKE COUNTY, INDIANA, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18/18125.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
 76. Tim Sparks, Cost of Death Penalty Trial Can Tip Decision, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, 
Oct. 25, 2001, at 1.  
 77. Id.  
 78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: GREENE COUNTY, INDIANA, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18/18055.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 79. See Suspect Makes Deal To Testify in Slaying, MOBILE REG., Feb. 4, 1999, at Z10. 
 80. Sparks, supra note 76. 
 81. Id. In another Indiana case, prosecutors declined to seek the death penalty for a nurse 
convicted of killing six patients and suspected in the deaths of dozens of others because of the 
costs of seeking the death penalty. See Bill Dedman, Ex-Nurse Sentenced to 360 Years in 
Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A21 (“Prosecutors did not seek the death penalty because 
of the higher costs of prosecuting a death penalty case.”). 
 82. Sparks, supra note 76 (quoting Marion County prosecutor as saying that “the cost of the 
death penalty is never a factor in deciding against pursuing a death sentence” even though “a 
death penalty trial there demands the resources of five normal murder cases”). 
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The District Attorney of Victoria County, Texas (population eighty-six 
thousand)83 has stated that “he must consider many factors, including 
strategy, time and cost when deciding if he’ll seek the death 
penalty.”84 In Hamilton County, Ohio, a Cincinnati prosecutor 
defended a plea bargain for a man who opened fire inside a business 
and killed two people because it “spared the victims the trauma of a 
trial and saved the taxpayers thousands of dollars.”85 In Albuquerque, 
New Mexico, a prosecutor declined to seek the death penalty for a man 
accused of killing three people primarily because of the strength of the 
case.86 Although the prosecutor claimed resources were a secondary 
priority, she did acknowledge that seeking death “would take a 
minimum of seven people out of the office for eight weeks. And we 
have a tremendous caseload, a tremendous demand for our 
resources.”87 In Baltimore City, which rarely seeks the death 
penalty,88 a veteran prosecutor explained, “I don’t have a moral 
problem with the death penalty; I have a resource problem with it.”89 
Put simply, prosecutors only have a certain amount of money, and 
they must prioritize how to spend it.90  
Unfortunately, the importance of money compounds the 
arbitrariness problem over time. Counties with the funds to prosecute 
large numbers of death penalty cases end up handling many of those 
cases and thereby training their lawyers how to litigate them 
effectively.91 Thus, county prosecutors with the most death penalty 
experience should be more likely to win at trial and should be able to 
 
 83. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS,  
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48469.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  
 84. See, e.g., Leslie Wilber, No Death Penalty for 2 Defendants in Slaying, VICTORIA 
ADVOCATE, May 8, 2008 (quoting the Victoria County District Attorney as saying that cost is one 
factor that must be considered in deciding whether to seek the death penalty). 
 85. Jessica Brown, West Gets 2 Life Terms, No Parole, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 24, 2004. 
 86. Ollie Reed, Jr., DA Decision Not to Retry Harrison Wasn’t Easy, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., 
Feb. 19, 2001, at A1. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 89. Julie Bykowicz, Death Penalty Has Cost: Circumstances, Resources Guide Baltimore’s 
Policy, BALT. SUN, Sept. 3, 2006, at 1A. 
 90. See infra Part III.A (discussing the cost savings that come from a statewide capital 
punishment system). In some states, the state government does step up to the plate to reimburse 
counties for some of the high costs of death penalty prosecutions. See infra notes 223–227 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. See Brewer, supra note 68 (quoting veteran Harris County prosecutor Ted Wilson as 
saying, “Quite honestly, we just do so damn many more of [capital cases] than anyone else. You 
could go into any district attorney’s office in the state and not find as many lawyers with capital 
prosecution experience.”). 
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maintain a clean record that will survive on appeal.92 By contrast, 
counties that rarely seek the death penalty have little institutional 
knowledge on how to handle such complicated cases. This relative 
inexperience would seemingly lead to increased costs and more losses 
at trial. In turn, the monetary and psychological toll may well lead 
small counties to hesitate before seeking the death penalty in 
situations where a district attorney’s office experienced in death 
penalty litigation would have no such hesitation.93 
Financial factors also likely affect the viewpoints of lawyers 
who spend their entire careers in a single district attorney’s office and 
rise to leadership positions. Prosecutors who work for years in offices 
that have the resources to seek the death penalty consistently may 
come to see aggressive use of the death penalty as appropriate. By 
contrast, prosecutors in cash-strapped counties that never saw their 
supervisors pursuing capital punishment may be more likely to 
believe that this approach is correct.94 Regardless of which approach is 
correct, these entrenched views of the death penalty are likely passed 
down from one generation of lawyers to the next.95 And these 
 
 92. The former proposition—winning at trial—is not controversial, however the latter 
proposition—surviving on appeal—is not supported by Professor Liebman’s study of thousands of 
death penalty cases. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 340 (finding that the higher the rate a 
county imposes death sentences, the higher the reversal rate); see also James S. Liebman, The 
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2048 (2000) (discussing the strong incentives 
to overproduce death sentences).  
 93. This issue has recently arisen in the very expensive “big city” Atlanta prosecution of 
Brian Nichols for killing four courthouse employees. A Republican State Senator recently 
explained that “the cost of the Nichols case is making prosecutors think twice about whether to 
seek the death penalty in future cases.” NPR Morning Edition, Delays Costly In Courthouse 
Slaying Suspect's Trial, 2008 WLNR 12936560, July 10, 2008. 
 94. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecution 
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 241 (2003) (“Lawyers in a particular U.S. Attorney's 
office generally hail from that district, and thus are nurtured in a particular legal climate unique 
to that jurisdiction. What juries and federal prosecutors deem important in a small district that 
encompasses rural communities may be quite different from those in a large, urban district. As a 
consequence, even if the policies are not expressly recorded, individual offices will have 
declination guidelines that arise from custom or practice.”); see also Frank O. Bowman III, 
Response, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual Extinction of the Federal 
Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 239 (2007), http://www. 
pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007/Bowman.pdf (“[P]rosecutors made cautious by inexperience 
and office culture may be especially likely to make risky cases go away, leaving little but ‘slam 
dunks’ for trial.”); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 424 
(contending that “culture of integrity, as defined by clearly understood and implemented policies 
and rules, may be more important in shaping the ethics . . . than hiring the ‘right’ people” 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).  
 95. See, e.g., Tolson, supra note 43 (explaining how the newly elected district attorney in 
Harris County, who had worked with his predecessor for nearly two decades, “promises no 
change in philosophy on the use of capital punishment”). 
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entrenched opinions help to explain why, over long periods of time, 
some counties have a stronger culture of seeking the death penalty.  
In sum, although most elected prosecutors will not admit it 
publicly, money affects use of the death penalty. Wealthy counties can 
afford to seek death more often, and doing so may become a self-
fulfilling prophecy whereby their lawyers are well trained to handle 
such cases and see death as appropriate. By contrast, smaller and 
poorer counties will pass up the opportunity to seek the ultimate 
punishment because they lack the enormous funds necessary to do so. 
D. A County-Based System Allows the Problem of Inadequate Lawyers 
and Under-Funded Indigent Defense to Fester 
The problems with capital punishment are certainly not 
limited to the prosecution side. Nearly all capital defendants are too 
poor to hire their own lawyers and are therefore provided with free 
counsel in the form of a public defender or an appointed lawyer.96 
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions these poor defendants receive 
inadequate representation because their lawyers are ineffective or 
because otherwise-competent lawyers are woefully underfunded.97  
The former problem—utterly incompetent lawyers—receives 
the most attention. There are frightening stories about sleeping or 
intoxicated lawyers who provide practically no assistance at trial. The 
state of North Carolina executed a man in 2001 even though his 
lawyer admitted to drinking twelve shots of rum every day during the 
penalty phase of the trial.98 The lawyer failed to present the jury with 
evidence that the defendant’s alcoholic parents had given him away 
when he was four years old, he had started using cocaine before his 
teenage years, and he had been shuffled to six different families before 
dropping out of high school.99 Around the time of trial, the lawyer was 
in a midday car accident and found to have a near-lethal blood-alcohol 
level of 0.44.100  
Then there are the lawyers appointed to capital cases despite 
being sanctioned for prior misconduct. A Tennessee study found that 
eleven lawyers remained eligible to take death penalty cases despite 
having been disciplined by the Bar “for unethical or illegal 
 
 96. See Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535, 
535 (1995) (“The State virtually always pays for the defense of those whom it seeks to execute.”). 
 97. Bright, supra note 18, at 1844. 
 98. Jeffrey Gettleman, Execution Ends Debatable Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A1.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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activities.”101 A similar inquiry in North Carolina determined that one 
in six defendants sentenced to death were represented by lawyers who 
had been disciplined by the North Carolina State Bar.102  
Legendary stories also exist of unqualified political cronies 
being appointed to handle cases as payback for contributing to judges’ 
campaigns.103 Until the mid-1990s this was common in Harris County, 
Texas, the so-called capital of capital punishment. The infamous Joe 
Cannon was regularly appointed to capital cases even though he was 
widely known for falling asleep during trial.104 Other unqualified 
lawyers also received appointments because “courthouse appointment 
lists were often an informal string of each judge’s friends and 
campaign contributors.”105 
Finally, there are cases of non-criminal lawyers with little or 
no litigation experience handling capital cases. In Illinois, a judge 
appointed a tax lawyer who had never tried a case before to represent 
a defendant facing the death penalty.106 Another Illinois judge 
appointed a real estate and probate lawyer who, when asked whether 
he had ever handled a criminal jury trial by himself, replied, “Well, is 
paternity criminal?”107 In Texas, a wrongfully convicted man spent 
years on death row after also being represented by a real estate 
lawyer at trial.108 
 
 101. John Shiffman, Troubled Lawyers Still Allowed to Work Death Cases, TENNESSEAN, July 
25, 2001, at A1.  
 102. Ronald J. Tabak, Why an Independent Appointing Authority Is Necessary to Choose 
Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2003) 
(citing COMMON SENSE FOUND., LIFE AND DEATH LOTTERY (2002), http://www.common-sense.org 
/?fnoc=./consider_this/consider_this_021015). 
 103. See id. at 1113–14 (recounting cronyism between a Texas judge and his “buddy,” who 
was “incompetent to handle capital cases”). 
 104. See Flood, supra note 43, at A1 (stating that “the late state District Judge George 
Walker, occasionally known for taking a nap on the bench, frequently appointed his good friend, 
the late Joe Cannon, who slept through parts of a capital murder trial”); see also Paul M. Barrett, 
On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 7, 1994, at A1 (quoting a sworn affidavit of Cannon’s co-counsel that Cannon slept through 
“significant periods [of the jury selection] on numerous occasions”).  
 105. Flood, supra note 43, at A1. 
 106. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts: With Their Lives at Stake, 
Defendants in Illinois Capital Trials Need the Best Attorneys Available. But They Often Get Some 
of the Worst, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, at 1. 
 107. Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 959 (2004) (quoting 
People v. Rissley, No. 82536, 2001 Ill. LEXIS 241, at *40 (Ill. Mar. 15, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 795 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 2003)).  
 108. See Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full 
Habeas Corpus Review By Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting 
Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (2000) (explaining that although Randall Dale 
Adams was sentenced to death at trial, he was later exonerated). The unfortunate story of 
Randall Dale Adams was made famous in the documentary THE THIN BLUE LINE (MGM 1988).  
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Just as troubling as the anecdotal stories of bad lawyering is 
the pervasive funding problem for indigent defense throughout the 
nation. In many jurisdictions, highly competent appointed lawyers are 
unable to provide adequate defenses because they lack the funding to 
handle the cases effectively. As Stephen Bright has explained, even 
though public defender offices “attract some of the most dedicated and 
conscientious young lawyers, those lawyers find it exhausting and 
enormously difficult to provide adequate representation when saddled 
with huge caseloads and lacking the necessary investigative 
assistance.”109 Not only do these lawyers lack the money to hire 
investigators, some must also subsist with insufficient basic 
necessities such as office equipment, technology, adequate support 
staff, and expert witness funding.110 Of course, prosecutors’ offices are 
not flush with cash, but they still possess considerably greater assets 
than many of the defense lawyers representing indigent defendants. 
An analysis of Harris County, Texas found that the district attorney’s 
entire office budget was $26 million in 1999, compared with $11.6 
million for “attorneys for indigent clients in county and district 
court.”111 
Writing more than a decade ago, Professor Douglas Vick 
observed that “[i]n most death penalty states, indigent defense is 
funded at the county level, where it ‘compete[s] as a very low priority 
among a multitude of other governmental services.’ ”112 And while a 
handful of states have moved toward providing more state funding for 
indigent defense generally,113 many of the nation’s counties continue 
 
 109. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services 
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816. 
 110. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10 (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf. 
 111. Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County Courts; Those Using Appointed 
Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at A1. In 1992 and 
1996, one report found that roughly 80 percent of defendants charged with felonies in seventy-
five of the nation’s most populous counties—of which Harris County is one—utilized public 
defenders or assigned counsel. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2001), available at http://bjs. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772.  
 112. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and 
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 394 (1995) (quoting Jonathan E. Gradess, The 
Road From Scottsboro: We’re Not as Far Along as We Think, 2 CRIM. JUST., Summer 1987, at 2, 
4).  
 113. See Mary Sue Bachus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1103–16 (2006) (describing legislation providing for 
additional funding in Texas, Georgia, Virginia, Washington, and Montana). 
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to lack sufficient funds to provide an adequate defense for capital and 
non-capital defendants.114  
In sum, county funding of indigent defense is considered by 
many to be a failure.115 In all too many jurisdictions, defendants end 
up with attorneys who are either incompetent or simply lack the 
resources to provide an adequate defense. 
E. Poor Judges Fail to Stop Misconduct and Allow                       
Reversible Error to Occur  
When scholars analyze the actors in the death penalty system, 
they focus primarily on prosecutors and defense lawyers.116 Little 
attention is paid to the judges who preside over death penalty cases. 
Perhaps the lack of attention is due to the obvious nature of the 
problem: some judges are simply better than others at running a fair 
trial that is unlikely to be reversed on appeal. This problem exists in 
every area of the legal system; some bankruptcy judges understand 
the code better than others, just as some family court judges are wiser 
than their colleagues. The situation is no different in death penalty 
cases. Some judges are truly excellent while others, unfortunately, are 
not as knowledgeable about the law or strong enough to reign in 
aggressive lawyers.  
The disparity in the quality of judges is arguably more 
important in capital cases than in other areas of law—after all, a 
person’s life is on the line. If we take to heart the Supreme Court’s 
 
 114. See Eric M. Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systematically: Governments’ 
Responsibilities Under the Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1097, 1100–01 (2003) (“[T]he states simply refuse to allocate sufficient funds to provide 
competent capital defense representation. But that does not make the costs disappear. It just 
shifts them.”).  
 115. The commentary to Guideline 2.1 of the American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases recognizes that defender 
organizations should be statewide so as to avoid political pressure and improve funding. ABA 
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES Guideline 2.1, cmt. at 20 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf (“Jurisdiction-
wide organization and funding can best ameliorate local disparities in resources and quality of 
representation, and insulate the administration of defense services from local political 
pressures.’”); see also Catherine Greene Burnett, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital 
Counsel: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165, 196 (2007) (suggesting the 
“radical” change that Texas create a “unified, statewide capital defense office”). 
 116. The excellent work of the Capital Jury Project has also focused on jurors. See, e.g., 
SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY (2005) 
(explaining the decision-making process of jurors); William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: 
Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995) (same). 
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assertion that “death is different,”117 then the deprivation of life, as 
opposed to liberty or property, is the most serious government action 
imaginable.118 It stands to reason that we should have the best 
possible judges presiding over such trials.  
Pragmatic concerns also counsel that high-quality judges are 
more important in capital cases. Death penalty law is very 
complicated, and the Supreme Court is continually “tinker[ing] with 
the machinery of death.”119 And even when the Court is not changing 
the law, it has a “troublesome affinity for obsessing over capital cases” 
by getting into the factual details of individual cases in a way unseen 
in other areas of law.120 It therefore is not surprising that Professor 
James Liebman’s enormous study of capital cases from 1973 to 1995 
reveals that 68 percent of capital cases were reversed on appeal by 
federal or state appeals courts.121 While many of the most common 
reversible errors—such as failing to disclose favorable evidence and 
ineffective assistance of counsel—are outside the hands of judges,122 
some errors are not. Some capital cases are reversed because judges 
reject defense lawyers’ challenges to questionable peremptory 
challenges made by prosecutors.123 Others are reversed because judges 
give incorrect jury instructions124 or fail to shut down lawyers making 
 
 117. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”). 
 118. I have previously made this argument in the context of post-trial proportionality review. 
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: 
Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages 
Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1288–91 (2000) (arguing that the right to life is more important 
than the right to liberty and the right to property). 
 119. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating 
that he would no longer “tinker with the machinery of death”) 
 120. Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time: Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture 
of Death,” 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861, 875 (2008) (acknowledging that Supreme Court 
Justices and their clerks are “institutionally inclined to give particular careful, cautious, and 
conscientious attention to every claim of death penalty error raised by capital defendants” due to 
the “practical problems with the administration of the death penalty”). 
 121. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at i. 
 122. But see Liebman, supra note 92, at 2111–12 (2000) (arguing that judges could demand 
that more evidence be produced or refuse to appoint ineffective lawyers but decline to do so out of 
self-interest in being reelected). 
 123. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265–66 (2005) (vacating conviction and 
death sentence because prosecutors used peremptory challenges to strike ten of eleven black 
prospective jurors without offering sufficient race-neutral reasons). 
 124.  See James S. Liebman, Jeff Fagan & Valerie West, Technical Errors Can Kill, NAT’L 
L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/643 (listing faulty jury 
instructions as a significant error leading to reversal in capital cases).  
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prejudicial arguments.125 Still other cases are reversed because 
defendants are not permitted to present relevant mitigating 
evidence.126 Even if such errors cause only a small number of 
reversals, they are nevertheless avoidable errors. And given the 
enormous time, expense, and emotional turmoil involved in capital 
cases, anything that can reduce reversals should be explored. 
An excellent judge is likely to minimize reversible error in at 
least two ways. First, a judge who is well versed in the law is less 
likely to make erroneous rulings that would provide a basis for 
reversal on appeal.127 Second, a well-respected judge will deter the 
parties from “pushing the envelope” at trial. With a firm, tough judge 
in the driver’s seat, prosecutors seemingly would be less likely to try to 
eliminate prospective jurors based on race or make aggressive 
arguments that step over the line. 
Unfortunately, the current death penalty system does little to 
push aside less qualified judges. In most counties, capital cases are 
randomly assigned, just like other criminal matters. Some death 
penalty cases end up in the hands of good judges, while others do not. 
The skill of judges in capital trials, however, need not be left to 
chance. As the next Part demonstrates, it is possible to create a 
statewide capital punishment system that is staffed by elite 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. 
II. DESIGNING A STATEWIDE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM 
As discussed in Part I, there are serious problems with the 
prosecution, defense, and judging of county-based death penalty cases. 
That does not mean that there are not prosecutors who make good 
charging decisions, appointed lawyers who vigorously defend cases, 
and judges who run a tight and fair ship. Too often, such high-quality 
 
 125. See Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing 
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1154–56 (2002) 
(discussing improper arguments, including reference to religious or biblical writings). 
 126. See, e.g., Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 1999) (ordering new 
sentencing hearing, inter alia, because the defendant was not permitted to introduce polygraph 
evidence explaining why previous criminal charges against him had been dismissed). 
 127. Let me be clear that I am looking for the most learned judges, not necessarily jurists 
who have simply spent a lot of time on the bench. As Professor David Schwartz recently found 
with respect to patent cases, there is no evidence that “district judges’ reversal rates decrease as 
they handle more patent cases.” David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study 
of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 256 (2008). 
Assuming Professor Schwartz’s findings would be transferable to other areas of law, that does 
not mean an elite group of death penalty judges cannot help reduce the number of reversals. His 
findings do seem to indicate, however, that we must choose judges carefully and not simply rely 
on longevity as our primary criterion. 
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lawyering goes unrecognized by academics and abolitionists who 
criticize the death penalty generally. The problem with capital 
punishment in the United States is not that excellent death penalty 
lawyers do not exist. The problem is that the excellent lawyers are not 
asked to handle all of their states’ capital cases.  
Because capital cases are the most serious, we should call on 
the best prosecutors and defense lawyers from around the state to 
handle all of the state’s capital cases, not just the cases from their 
home counties. In this Part, I argue that the state’s best prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and judges should work on a statewide, rather than a 
county-wide, basis and handle all of the state’s death penalty cases.128 
A. An Anecdotal Example of a Fair Fight: Bringing in Top-Notch 
Lawyers from Outside the County Line 
During her twenty-one years as a Harris County prosecutor, 
Kelly Siegler became a famed trial lawyer and personally handled 
nineteen death penalty trials, eighteen of which resulted in a death 
sentence.129 Siegler was so skilled in the courtroom that Twentieth 
 
 128. The State of Illinois has implemented a system that moves in this direction but does not 
go far enough. Following the large number of exonerations in Illinois in the 1990s, the Illinois 
Supreme Court established the Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases. Barbara J. 
Hayler, Moratorium and Reform: Illinois’s Efforts to Make the Death Penalty Process “Fair, Just, 
and Accurate,” 29 JUST. SYS. J. 423, 424 (2008). The Committee recommended that “[l]ead 
counsel would be required to have at least five years of criminal litigation experience; to have 
tried at least eight felony trials, including two murder cases; and to have specialized capital-case 
training or experience.” Id. at 425. Unfortunately, the Illinois approach still allows too many 
lawyers to be involved in capital cases, rather than relying on an elite unit. As one observer 
noted, by the end of 2004, the Illinois Capital Litigation Trial Bar had 714 lawyers certified to 
handle capital cases. See Judge Michael P. Toomin, Capital Punishment Reform and the Illinois 
Supreme Court: At the Forefront of Change, 92 ILL. B.J. 642, 644 (2004) (“As of October 15, 2005, 
714 attorneys statewide have been certified as members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar . . . 
.”). As I explain below, the number of death penalty lawyers should be much smaller in order to 
promote consistency and to ensure that quality representation is always provided. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.2 (advocating selection of the best defense lawyers to represent defendants 
charged with capital offenses). The Chair of the Illinois General Assembly Capital Punishment 
Reform Committee appears to agree, as he recently lamented that “the capital punishment 
system in Illinois lacks any overall, statewide system in place to assure consistency in capital 
certifications or to protect against . . . racial and geographic bias.” Thomas P. Sullivan, Efforts to 
Improve the Illinois Capital Punishment System: Worth the Cost?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 966 
(2007); see also Robert S. Burke, The Illinois Death Penalty Defense System and the ABA Capital 
Defense Guidelines, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 348, 353–54 (2008) (reviewing the Illinois approach to 
appointing defense lawyers in capital cases and explaining that there is minimal monitoring of 
lawyers or corrective action for inadequate performance). 
 129. The Law Offices of Kelly Siegler, Bio, http://www.kellysieglerlaw.com/bio.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
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Century Fox ordered a television pilot based on her career.130 In 2008, 
after losing her bid to become the elected Harris County District 
Attorney, Siegler quietly resigned her position as an assistant district 
attorney.131 She declined numerous lucrative offers to work in private 
practice,132 and instead she accepted a post-election position as a 
special assistant prosecutor in Wharton County, Texas, to work on a 
single case: the capital prosecution of James Garrett Freeman.133  
Wharton County has a population of just over forty thousand 
people.134 And despite being only sixty miles from Harris County, 
which had 119 inmates awaiting execution on death row as of the 
summer of 2008,135 Wharton County had not prosecuted a death 
penalty case in over thirty years.136 The County chose to seek the 
death penalty against Freeman after he engaged in a shootout with 
game warden officers and killed an officer in cold blood.137 
Notably, Siegler was in for a tough fight because Freeman was 
represented by Stanley Schneider, one of Houston’s most recognized 
and effective criminal defense lawyers.138 Schneider had been honored 
by the State Bar of Texas as the Outstanding Criminal Defense 
Lawyer of the Year139 and had three decades of experience in capital 
 
 130. See Brian Rogers, Defense Attorney Dick DeGuerin is Methodical, Prosecutor Kelly 
Siegler Is Theatrical: In the Temple Murder Trial, Expect Fireworks, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 20, 
2007, at A1 (“In 2005, 20th Century Fox TV shot a television pilot based on Siegler’s life.”).  
 131. Peggy O’Hare, Siegler Resigns From DA’s Office, She Will Try Capital Murder Case in 
Wharton County Later This Year, HOUSTON CHRON., May 10, 2008, at B1. 
 132. See id. (pointing out that Siegler accepted the Wharton County position despite having 
“between five and 10” job offers from civil law firms and other district attorneys’ offices). 
 133. See id. (“Siegler is looking forward to working as a special prosecutor, trying a capital 
murder case in Wharton County this fall.”). 
 134. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: WHARTON COUNTY, TEXAS, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48481.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 135. Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUSTON L. 
REV. 807, 838 (2008).  
 136. See Peggy O’Hare, Game Warden Slaying: Wharton Residents Assemble for Trial: Death 
Penalty Case Is the First in This Small Town in Three Decades, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 9, 2008, 
at B1 (stating that Freeman’s trial is the first death penalty trial to occur in Wharton since the 
1970s). 
 137. See Peggy O’Hare, Murder Trial in Death of Warden Begins: Death Penalty Case is the 
First in Decades in Wharton County, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 20, 2008, at B1 (“I believe that 
someone who kills a cop is just a little more culpable than, say, some thug who, in the heat of an 
armed robbery, kills someone.”); see also Brandon L. Leonard, 600 Summoned for Capital 
Murder Case, VICTORIA ADVOC., Sept. 9, 2008, at 1 (“He is charged with capital murder in the 
shooting death of game warden Justin Hurst, 34.”). 
 138. See Brian Rogers, Former Harris Prosecutor to Testify About Confession, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Sept. 20, 2008 (describing Schneider as a “a prominent defense attorney”). 
 139. Rose Nisker, The Crusaders of Death Row, TEXAS SUPER LAWYERS, Oct. 2009, available 
at http://www.superlawyers.com/texas/article/The-Crusaders-of-Death-Row/aa6f34b2-8696-4974-
840b-4015ca4bed47.html.  
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cases.140 Although he was based out of Houston, Schneider accepted 
the case. Ultimately, Freeman was convicted and sentenced to 
death.141 And while appeals will certainly continue for years, there is 
little chance that a plausible ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
could be leveled against Schneider. 
Regardless of whether one thinks Freeman was the “worst of 
the worst” and deserving of death, his case is notable for the quality of 
the attorneys on both sides. Even more noteworthy is that both the 
prosecutor and defense lawyer were brought in from outside the 
county line to handle the case.  
The question, then, is whether the Freeman case can be used 
as a model to move from a county-based death penalty system to a 
statewide approach. As I explain in Part II.B below, it is plausible to 
create a functioning statewide capital punishment system, even in 
very large states that have long relied on a county-based death 
penalty model. 
B. Transitioning to a Statewide Capital Punishment System Staffed by 
Elite Prosecutors, Defense Lawyers, and Judges 
In a world of perfect information, it would be easy to transition 
to a statewide system because everyone would know that Pam 
Prosecutor from Los Angeles and Dan Defense Attorney from San 
Francisco are the best in the business. In reality, however, most 
lawyers have little knowledge about their peers in other counties. 
Moreover, attorney skill is highly subjective. It would therefore be 
very difficult to select a statewide team by relying solely on word of 
mouth. A more plausible approach would be to begin primarily with 
“paper” qualifications to select the first group of lawyers and then to 
allow those lawyers to give significant input in selecting the next wave 
of attorneys. Let us begin with selecting the prosecutors. 
1. Selecting the Best Prosecutors by Relying on Quantitative and 
Qualitative Information 
At the outset, participation in an elite statewide capital 
prosecution unit should require considerable experience. Thus, to 
 
 140. See Rosanna Ruiz & Mike Tolson, Capital Punishment on Decline in County, HOUSTON 
CHRON., July 25, 2007, at A1 (stating that Schneider “has been involved in death penalty cases 
for three decades”). 
 141. Sonny Long, Unanimous Death Sentence: Wharton County Jury Gives Game Warden’s 
Killer the Ultimate Penalty, VICTORIA ADVOC., Nov. 8, 2008, at A1. 
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serve as an elite capital prosecutor, state legislatures should require 
that a lawyer possess such experience. For example, they should 
require at least ten years of experience in handling felony cases and 
serving as counsel of record in at least five death penalty cases. Of 
course, because it would be impossible for future generations of 
lawyers to gain death penalty experience if they were not already in 
the capital case unit, this requirement would have to be modified after 
the first round of capital prosecutors.142  
Another obvious criterion is ethics. The legislature should 
eliminate any prosecutor who has been the subject of a successful 
ethics complaint filed with the bar.143 More importantly, any lawyer 
who has had at least one case (capital or otherwise) reversed for 
prosecutorial misconduct should be excluded. While “misconduct” 
could be defined in many ways, the legislature should be most 
concerned with the serious types of misconduct that lead to reversal of 
criminal convictions: suppressing favorable evidence, striking 
prospective jurors based on race, and presenting improper arguments 
to the jury.144  
Regarding general appellate records, prosecutors should not be 
disqualified from service because they have a less-than-perfect record 
on appeal in their capital cases. As Professor James Liebman and his 
colleagues have demonstrated, thousands of capital cases have been 
reversed on appeal over the last few decades, often for reasons beyond 
the control of prosecutors, such as erroneous jury instructions or 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel.145 Still, an elite statewide 
capital punishment unit should be staffed with prosecutors who know 
how to select and try cases with an eye toward avoiding reversal. In 
order to help narrow down the list of eligible prosecutors, the 
legislature should impose a bright-line rule eliminating prosecutors 
 
 142. Additionally, if a state had recently enacted the death penalty or has rarely sought it in 
previous years, no prosecutor would have experience in five or more cases. For these states, the 
experience requirement would have to be modified.  
 143. By “successful,” I mean a complaint resulting in a finding that the prosecutor has 
engaged in misconduct.  This will likely not be much of a qualifier because successful ethics 
complaints are rare even against misbehaving prosecutors. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary 
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 
(1987) (claiming that despite universal adoption by the states of disciplinary rules, and despite 
numerous reported cases showing violations of these rules, “disciplinary charges have been 
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely applied”). 
 144. Unfortunately, there are dozens of capital cases that have been reversed for these types 
of misconduct. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1075–84 (2009) (discussing some of the 
twenty-six Brady violations and fifteen Batson violations that led to reversals of capital 
convictions between 1997 and 2007). 
 145. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. 
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whose capital cases have been reversed more than, for example, 25 
percent of the time.146  
These quantitative (or “paper”) requirements would 
significantly narrow the list of eligible prosecutors, but they probably 
would not be enough to select a final group. Thus, more qualitative, 
reputational criteria should also be employed. The initial list should 
be narrowed and the final candidates selected based on input from 
lawyers who have practiced with them. Because the prosecutors are a 
statewide unit, the state attorney general should be responsible for 
gathering input and making the final decision. Thus, the enabling 
statute should instruct the attorney general to survey prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and judges who have worked with each finalist, just 
as local bar associations survey lawyers to ascertain their views on 
judicial candidates.147 If a majority of defense lawyers or judges rates 
a candidate as “unqualified,” then the attorney general should be 
forced to strike that candidate from the list.148  
Finally, the legislation should instruct the attorney general to 
achieve geographic diversity in selecting prosecutors. Unless the 
attorney general specifies in writing that there are no viable 
candidates, she should be required to select at least one prosecutor 
from each of the state’s federal districts.149 Moreover, to ensure that 
the views of smaller counties are represented, the attorney general 
should also be required to select at least one prosecutor from a county 
with a population of less than two hundred and fifty thousand people.  
Ideally, the attorney general would choose prosecutors who are 
respected not only by fellow prosecutors, but also by the defense 
lawyers and judges with whom they have worked for many years.150 
 
 146. A 75 percent success rate would actually be quite impressive. See id. (finding a 68 
percent reversal rate for capital cases between 1973 and 1995).  
 147. For a discussion of one state’s approach to surveying opinions of judicial candidates, see 
A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects, and 
Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 655–61 (1998). 
 148. This rule should operate reciprocally when selecting statewide defense lawyers. If a 
majority of prosecutors or judges rates a defense lawyer as unqualified, she should be eliminated 
from consideration.  
 149. In smaller states, of course, there will be only one federal district from which to choose. 
 150. Of course, it is possible that the Attorney General will select candidates who mirror his 
ideological view of the death penalty, rather than choosing solely based on qualifications. See 
Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an 
Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 771, 802 (1999) (arguing for a committee, rather 
than a single district attorney, to determine who should face the death penalty, but recognizing 
that “[t]he composition of the death penalty committee is likely to reflect the views espoused by 
the individuals who select members”). This problem is tempered by the fact that the Attorney 
General can only select prosecutors who have already met the seniority, experience, ethics, and 
low reversal qualifications. 
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However, even if the attorney general does not have the purest of 
motives, the “paper” qualifications would limit her discretion and 
ensure that an experienced, qualified, and diverse group of 
prosecutors from across the state is selected as the first group of 
statewide capital prosecutors. 
If the legislature were to follow this suggested approach, it 
would eventually lead to a new problem. Once the transition to a 
statewide death penalty system is complete and all death penalty 
cases are handled by the new unit, local prosecutors will no longer be 
able to acquire any capital trial experience. Thus, once prosecutors 
from the statewide capital unit retire, there would be no one with 
enough capital experience to be eligible to replace them. Accordingly, 
the requirement that statewide prosecutors have handled five death 
penalty cases should only apply to the initial group of prosecutors who 
are selected for the elite unit.  
Once those elite prosecutors are in place, they should begin 
interviewing experienced prosecutors to join the capital unit as junior 
capital prosecutors. These prosecutors would still need to have 
sterling records—at least ten years of felony experience, no ethical 
violations, and no reversals for prosecutorial misconduct—but they 
need not have extensive death penalty experience. The original elite 
team of statewide prosecutors, with their years of capital experience, 
would be in a good position to select their junior subordinates from 
around the state.151 And the original elite team of experienced capital 
prosecutors should be well suited to mentoring and evaluating their 
junior colleagues. Because the junior prosecutors would be working 
exclusively on capital cases once they join the statewide unit, the 
senior prosecutors would have an uninterrupted opportunity to 
observe their talents and weaknesses. If they do well, the junior 
prosecutors would eventually be promoted when the original members 
of the elite capital team retire or return to their home jurisdictions. 
With multiple years of exclusively death penalty cases under their 
belts, the formerly junior prosecutors would be ready to take over 
primary responsibility for their state’s capital cases—and to select 
hard-working, smart, ethical prosecutors to take over the junior 
positions. 
 
 151. As with the initial group of prosecutors, junior prosecutors should come from each of the 
state’s federal districts and at least one should come from a county with a population of less than 
250,000 people. 
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2. Selecting the Best Defense Attorneys 
Once the prosecutors are selected, the next and equally 
important task is to select the very best defense attorneys. The 
qualifications for defense attorneys should be similar to those for 
prosecutors. The original group of statewide defense attorneys should 
have extensive and unblemished resumes: for instance, at least ten 
years of felony experience, no ethical violations, no successful 
ineffective assistance of counsel challenges, and a minimum of five 
death penalty cases.152  
As with the selection of prosecutors, once these initial “paper” 
qualifications are satisfied, the attorney general’s office should survey 
lawyers and judges from each candidate’s jurisdiction. Any candidate 
with a majority of “unqualified” votes should be disqualified. 
Thereafter, the attorney general should select among the remaining 
candidates. Because defense lawyers are not responsible for capital 
charging, ensuring representation from around the state and from 
small counties is not essential; although defense lawyers’ life 
experiences may differ depending on whether they are from a smaller 
county or a large city, those different experiences will not affect the 
prosecutors’ charging decisions. Accordingly, geographic diversity in 
selecting defense lawyers should be aspirational, though not required. 
In selecting statewide capital defense lawyers, the single most 
important factor will be attorney skill. 
As with the elite prosecutors, the process must be slightly 
modified for the second generation of elite capital defense attorneys. 
Once the first wave of elite defense attorneys has been selected and 
begins handling all of the state’s capital cases, up-and-coming local 
defense attorneys (like their prosecutor counterparts) will be unable to 
acquire death penalty experience. Thus, the first generation of elite 
defense attorneys should be called upon to interview and hire junior 
lawyers. The junior lawyers should be required to fulfill all of the 
three “paper” qualifications that do not require specific death penalty 
experience: at least ten years of felony experience, no ethical 
violations, and no successful ineffective assistance of counsel 
challenges. As with prosecutors, the junior defense lawyers would 
 
 152. Unfortunately, the ineffectiveness criterion does not serve as much of a limitation 
because, while ineffective assistance challenges are often filed, they are rarely successful. See, 
e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (discussing the infrequency with which courts 
reverse convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing for prospective means 
of improving assistance of counsel). 
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learn the ropes by working exclusively on capital cases and would 
eventually move up the ladder to replace their senior colleagues. 
An important question is how this system should handle the 
less-common case in which a defendant wishes to retain a private 
lawyer, rather than accept state-funded indigent defense counsel. The 
best practice would be for private lawyers to be permitted to 
supplement—but not supplant—the elite lawyers from the capital 
defense unit. In Illinois, which has recently established elaborate 
rules to ensure quality defense counsel, defense lawyers must be 
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar in order to be appointed 
to represent an indigent capital defendant.153 If a defendant can afford 
to retain a private lawyer who is not on the list, he is free to do so, but 
that lawyer must take a backseat to the two lead lawyers who are 
members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar.154 
The Illinois approach is sound. When jurisdictions across the 
country have taken steps to impose standards and to provide adequate 
funding, the quality of representation has vastly improved155 to the 
point where appointed lawyers are often better than retained 
counsel.156 Thus, while a retained lawyer might do a first-rate job in a 
capital case, it is possible that a lawyer who only occasionally handles 
capital cases will do a poor job.157 And because a statewide system is 
designed to equalize justice and eliminate post-trial claims such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it would be counterproductive to open 
up that possibility by allowing retained lawyers to replace the elite, 
state-funded defense lawyers. 
 
 153. See supra note 128 (discussing capital punishment reform in Illinois). 
 154. See Hayler, supra note 128, at 435 (discussing reforms to the Illinois death penalty 
system). 
 155. For instance, all observers appear to believe that indigent defense in Texas has 
improved substantially since the enactment of the Texas Fair Defense Act in 2001. See Kyung M. 
Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right 
to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 386 (2004) (“As reformers in Texas have been diligently 
working to change the system since 2001, the results so far have been promising, including some 
improvements in attorney selection procedures and attorney qualification requirements.”). 
 156. In Harris County, Texas, where the author resides, there is anecdotal (though no 
empirical) evidence to support this proposition. Cf. George C. Thomas, III, When Lawyers Fail 
Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH 
L. REV. 25, 43 (“During my small-town law practice, the representation of criminal defendants by 
appointed counsel, that sometimes included me, was competent if not stellar.”). 
 157. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1980) (recognizing that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims can be made against privately retained lawyers). 
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3. Selecting a Pool of Exceptional Judges 
Judges should also be selected from a pool of candidates who 
have the requisite tangible qualifications. For the initial group of 
judges, the legislature should limit death penalty cases to judges who 
have been on the bench hearing felony cases for at least ten years. 
These judges also should have no disciplinary infractions and should 
have received high marks on judicial qualification questionnaires 
conducted by the local bar.  
More importantly, however, the judges selected should have 
low reversal rates in capital and non-capital cases. At present, the 
nationwide reversal rates in capital cases are dramatically higher 
than in non-capital cases.158 While low reversal rates are not always a 
proxy for the best judges,159 the fact remains that the current death 
penalty system could benefit greatly from judges who run trials so as 
to avoid reversible error. As such, the initial qualification to be 
selected as an elite capital judge should be a below-average reversal 
rate in both capital and non-capital cases. Along with the requirement 
of ten years of felony experience, this requirement should narrow the 
list to a much smaller pool of eligible candidates.160 
Once a pool of eligible judges is in place, the prosecutors and 
defense lawyers should have the authority to select a particular judge 
for each trial. Just like the process for selecting an arbitrator in some 
states,161 the prosecutors and defense lawyers should be permitted an 
 
 158. Scholars estimate the reversal rate for ordinary criminal cases to be between 10 and 20 
percent, which is obviously far below the capital reversal rate. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the 
Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 516 (1992) (reviewing 
California cases and estimating that “approximately one criminal conviction in five was modified 
by the appellate process”); Liebman, supra note 92, at 2053 n.90 (estimating that non-capital 
reversal rate is “probably far less than ten percent”). 
 159. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 401–04 (2007) 
(challenging conventional wisdom that judges fear reversal and arguing that higher reversal 
rates do not necessarily inhibit promotion to higher judicial positions). 
 160. The Illinois Supreme Court has issued a rule requiring all judges presiding over capital 
cases to attend a capital litigation training seminar at least once every two years. See ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 43. This has resulted in hundreds of judges attending death penalty seminars. Toomin, 
supra note 128, at 644. According to the Chair of the Illinois General Assembly’s Capital 
Punishment Reform Committee, the training, along with other reform efforts, has established a 
situation in which “judges now assigned to try capital cases have the requisite knowledge and 
experience.” Sullivan, supra note 128, at 957. Once again, I believe this is a step in the right 
direction but it does not go far enough. Rather than training a large number of judges and 
hoping they do a good job, it would be preferable to put all of a state’s capital cases in the hands 
of a much smaller number of elite trial judges who can be trained more thoroughly and carefully 
monitored. 
 161. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES M-4(b) (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440%20 (“If the parties are 
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equal number of strikes to eliminate judges whom they find 
unacceptable. The last remaining judge should preside over the trial. 
In early cases, lawyers who have not appeared before a 
particular judge may find it hard to assess how favorable that judge 
will be toward the prosecution or defense. However, both prosecutors 
and defense lawyers can turn initially to statewide professional 
organizations—for instance, the District and County Attorneys’ 
Association, or the local chapter of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers—to seek information about judges they do 
not know. And after the lawyers have a few cases under their belts, 
they will quickly form their own opinions as to which judges are the 
most capable and fair. While prosecutors might prefer Judge X, and 
defense lawyers might prefer Judge Y, each side’s ability to strike 
judges would eliminate the outliers and leave a small group of judges 
to handle the vast majority of capital cases.  
Having a very small pool of mutually acceptable judges would 
have enormous benefits. The judges would get to know the prosecutors 
and defense lawyers who would appear frequently in front of them. By 
knowing each other, the lawyers and judges would hopefully work well 
together. This would move cases along briskly and reduce the time of 
trials, thus saving money. Perhaps more importantly, the judges 
would learn the strengths and weaknesses of individual lawyers. From 
repeated interaction, judges may come to recognize that a particular 
prosecutor is an aggressive questioner who pushes the boundaries of 
what is permissible. Judges would therefore know when to be on 
guard for prosecutors exceeding their bounds and thus cut off any 
prospect of reversible error before it occurs. 
In sum, the role of judges in capital cases is too important to be 
left to the whims of random assignment. Because it is plausible to 
separate the good judges from the bad, at least in terms of relative 
reversal rates, states should take steps to ensure that capital cases 
are staffed by the most competent judges who are least likely to be 
reversed. 
4. Adopting a Committee Approach to Capital Charging 
Once the key players are in place, the next logistical challenge 
is to determine which cases become death penalty cases and which are 
returned to local prosecutors to be tried as “ordinary” murder 
prosecutions. Having created an elite statewide group of prosecutors, 
 
unable to agree upon a mediator, each party shall strike unacceptable names from the list, 
number the remaining names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA.”). 
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the most effective approach would then be to utilize a committee made 
up of those prosecutors to make charging decisions. Many prosecutors’ 
offices already have advisory committees to recommend whether the 
district attorney should seek the death penalty.162 I would go further 
and turn over the entire charging decision to the committee.163 As 
explained below, junior prosecutors should prepare the cases, and 
senior prosecutors should vote on whether to seek the death penalty.  
After local prosecutors decide that a defendant will face murder 
charges, they should be statutorily obligated to refer the case to the 
elite capital punishment unit.164 That elite unit must then decide, for 
 
 162. The most prominent is the Department of Justice’s Capital Case Review Committee, 
which advises the U.S. Attorney General. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History 
and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 407–40 
(1999) (detailing the Department of Justice’s process for deciding how to prosecute potentially 
capital cases). For a discussion of U.S. Attorneys turning to a voluntary committee before 
referring the case to the Justice Department, see Benjamin Weiser, Pondering Death, by 
Committee: What Is a Capital Crime? Federal Panel Decides Case by Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
1997, at B1. 
 163. Other observers have advocated that capital charging be done by committees rather 
than individual prosecutors. The most detailed proposals are DeMay, supra note 150, at 811–18 
(proposing two solutions: (1) that a committee of experienced and ideologically diverse 
prosecutors review all potentially capital cases in order to make a non-binding recommendation 
on whether to seek the death penalty; and (2) a statewide committee made up of prosecutors 
from across the state that will make binding determinations on whether to seek death) and 
Horowitz, supra note 28, at 2573, 2600–02 (arguing for a committee appointed by the governor 
and the local district attorney to eliminate conflicts between state and local officials in 
jurisdictions that allow for supersedure). For other proposals, see Anna-Liisa Joseloff, 
Connecticut’s Capital Punishment Scheme: Still Tinkering With the Machinery of Death, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 889, 924 (2004) (advocating that a committee of the state’s attorneys be 
statutorily empowered to determine whether to seek the death penalty); McCarthy, supra note 
61, at 995 (suggesting that the state attorney general review every death eligible case); Paul 
Schoeman, Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Revise the 
Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 573 (1995) (suggesting an independent 
central authority that would require super majority vote to seek death). Finally, the Illinois 
Commission on Capital Punishment has proposed that a committee of five individuals–the 
Attorney General, the Cook County State’s Attorney, another county’s State’s Attorney, the 
president of the Illinois State’s Attorneys Association, and a retired judge–approve a local 
prosecutor’s request to seek the death penalty. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 84–85, 
Recommendation 30 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission 
_report/index.html. The Illinois legislature did not adopt this proposal. Thomas P. Sullivan, 
Capital Punishment Reform: What’s Been Done and What Remains to Be Done, 51 FED. LAW. 37, 
39 (2004). While these proposals have all recognized the benefits of capital charging, none would 
require the same prosecutors to actually try the cases and thereby eliminate county involvement 
altogether. 
 164. Federal cases are handled in a somewhat similar fashion. Whenever a federal grand 
jury indicts a capital crime and the U.S Attorney intends to seek the death penalty, the U.S. 
Attorney is required to notify the Department of Justice in writing. See Little, supra note 162, at 
409–10 (detailing the Department of Justice’s process for deciding how to prosecute potentially 
capital cases). 
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all murder cases in that state, whether to pursue the death penalty. If 
the local district attorney feels strongly that the defendant should face 
the death penalty, she should have the option to write a memorandum 
explaining why death is merited. Although such a memorandum is not 
required, it would be forwarded to a junior prosecutor in the elite 
capital unit. That junior prosecutor would then independently review 
the case. Either building on the local district attorney’s memorandum 
or starting from scratch, the junior prosecutor from the capital unit 
would draft a neutral memorandum for the senior prosecutors that 
analyzed the strength of the state’s case at guilt and sentencing. The 
memorandum would be analogous to a bench memorandum that law 
clerks write for their judges. 
Defense counsel should be invited to make an oral presentation 
before the junior prosecutor. Defense counsel may have facts relevant 
to guilt or punishment that might not be fully appreciated on a paper 
record. Such information may save prosecutors from seeking the death 
penalty in a case that would be hard to win at trial or to defend on 
appeal. Although it probably would not happen often, the opportunity 
for an hour-long presentation by defense counsel might save the state 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in trial and appeal costs by weeding 
out those cases that would likely result in a life sentence or less.165  
While the junior prosecutors should possess all information 
about the case, at least three pieces of information—the race of the 
defendant, the race of the victim,166 and the county where the crime 
occurred—should be redacted from their memorandum so as not to 
allow irrelevant criteria to influence the senior prosecutors in their 
final charging decisions.167  
Once complete, the memorandum should be provided to all 
senior prosecutors. Those prosecutors would then vote on whether to 
seek the death penalty. If a majority of the senior prosecutors votes to 
 
 165. See id. at 424–26 (noting that while he served on the Department of Justice’s capital 
committee defense counsel always invoked their right to make a presentation to the committee 
and that such presentations were effective); see also DeMay, supra note 150, at 810 (proposing 
that prosecutors should provide defense counsel with “an opportunity to present arguments why 
the defendant is not an appropriate candidate for the imposition of the death penalty”); Liebman, 
supra note 92, at 2145 (proposing that prosecutors should provide all defense counsel with “a 
meaningful opportunity to convince the district attorney to settle the case or at least not to 
proceed capitally”). 
 166. In some instances, it may also be necessary to redact the name of the defendant or 
victim if that name would indicate that the person is a member of a particular racial or ethnic 
group. 
 167. See Little, supra note 162, at 411–12 (noting that federal cases are presented to the 
Attorney General “ ‘race-blind,’ that is, devoid so far as possible of racial identification”). To the 
extent that a defendant is accused of a hate crime, it would make little sense to keep that 
information from the final decisionmakers, however.  
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seek the death penalty, one senior prosecutor should take charge of 
the case and should be assisted by the junior prosecutor who drafted 
the memorandum. If the senior prosecutors vote against seeking the 
death penalty, the case should then be returned to the local county 
prosecutor to be handled as an “ordinary” murder case. 
Committee charging would have numerous benefits. First, no 
single person would be able to rely too heavily on her personal 
experience. Different committee members with different life 
experiences would balance each other out. Second, money would cease 
to be a factor because the state would pay the bill, and the committee, 
rather than the elected local prosecutor, would decide how to spend 
the funds.168 While money may influence the total number of cases for 
which the committee approves death, no individual case would turn on 
local funding. Third, using a committee with steady membership 
would promote consistency because the same group of prosecutors 
would observe all of a state’s murder cases and would make all of the 
charging decisions. A committee with consistent membership thus 
would conduct an inverted proportionality review, in which cases 
would be judged against one another up front, rather than after trial, 
when time and money have already been expended.169 Relatedly, 
committee charging would increase the probability of prosecutors 
choosing the “right” cases—those that are most worthy of death— 
because they would not be looking at cases in isolation. Finally, this 
approach would uniquely use junior prosecutors to flush out the facts 
and draft a neutral memorandum to help the final decisionmakers 
make informed choices without reference to irrelevant factors such as 
race and geography. 
Given the benefits of charging committees, it is not surprising 
that the Department of Justice has implemented a charging 
committee approach similar to the one outlined above.170 Yet the 
example from the federal system is problematic. The final decision 
rests in the hands of a single individual, the Attorney General, 171 who 
 
 168. Of course, state prosecutors could also face funding pressures. At the statewide level, 
however, resources are not as scarce as they are at the local level. 
 169. The Supreme Court has held that post-trial proportionality review is not required. See 
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 49–51 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court precedent holding that 
proportionality review is not required). Nevertheless, about half of the states that impose the 
death penalty still provide for at least some level of proportionality review. See Maxine D. 
Goodman, A Death Penalty Wake-Up Call: Reducing the Risk of Racial Discrimination in Capital 
Punishment, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 29, 44 n.114 (2007) (listing states that do and do not 
provide for proportionality review). 
 170. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.  
 171. Little, supra note 162, at 412. 
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(as a political appointee) might never have tried a capital case.172 
Moreover, even if the Attorney General always follows the committee’s 
collective wisdom, the federal government would still not achieve a 
“pure” elite capital punishment unit because the prosecutors who 
constitute the charging committee at Main Justice are not the same 
prosecutors who handle the actual trials. Rather, local U.S. Attorneys 
prosecute the cases. In fact, in the federal system the local U.S. 
Attorneys can cut the rug out from under the central charging 
committee by taking a case where the Attorney General has decided to 
seek death and then negotiate it down to a prison term without 
consulting Main Justice.173 
To maximize the benefits of committee charging, it is important 
that the committee’s decision be final and that the members of the 
committee making the charging decisions be the very same 
prosecutors who are in the trenches actually prosecuting the cases. If 
we are able to attract the very best lawyers to serve in that capacity, 
there will be greater uniformity and fairness in the death penalty 
system. As the next section recognizes, however, attracting the best 
lawyers is a key challenge. 
5. Attracting the Best Lawyers to Work on Capital Cases 
One lingering but important question remains about the 
feasibility of statewide capital punishment units: How will we 
convince excellent local prosecutors and defense attorneys to leave 
their home jurisdictions and travel the state to work on death penalty 
cases? In other words, will excellent lawyers decline to participate in 
such a system because it is too inconvenient? Although some lawyers 
will be unwilling to serve, there are several reasons why many 
lawyers would uproot themselves temporarily to take on this 
important task.  
First, and hopefully most importantly, excellent prosecutors 
and defense lawyers have a commitment to justice and improving the 
criminal justice system. Committed lawyers regularly sacrifice 
convenience to further public service goals. And for lawyers who feel 
 
 172. For instance, recent Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, while having a wide variety of 
legal experience, never served as a prosecutor before becoming Attorney General and having 
final say over capital charging. See Jason McLure, Staying the Course: The AG Hasn’t Satisfied 
Critics Who Doubt His Independence, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1. 
 173. See Little, supra note 162, at 417–18 (“Under the protocols, United States Attorneys in 
the field may dispose of federal capital cases, once charged, without advance approval or review 
by the Attorney General or Main Justice.”). 
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strongly about capital punishment, either on the prosecution or 
defense side, the opportunity to devote all of their attention to a small 
number of very important cases would be a big draw.174 
A second reason why lawyers would sign up for an elite capital 
trial unit is prestige. Capital cases are already considered to be the 
most prominent cases in the criminal justice system, and lawyers are 
eager to sink their teeth into the biggest cases.175 Thus, many will be 
on board from the beginning.  
Third, prestige often translates into career advancement, 
including a higher-profile office. Serving as an elite prosecutor (and to 
a lesser extent as an elite defense lawyer) would be a stepping-stone to 
a judgeship or other elected office, such as attorney general or 
governor. And to the extent that Presidents look for the best possible 
lawyers when selecting U.S. Attorneys, trying exclusively high-profile 
death penalty cases would be a helpful qualification.  
In fact, prosecutors already accept assignments outside their 
geographic areas in order to heighten their prestige. After the collapse 
of energy giant Enron, the Department of Justice staffed the Enron 
Task Force with elite prosecutors from across the country.176 Members 
of the Task Force went on to secure prominent and lucrative positions, 
including Attorney General of Oregon,177 head of the Department of 
Justice Criminal Division, Interim U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of New York, Chief of Staff for the Director of the FBI, and 
partnership in some of the best white-shoe law firms in the country.178 
This model of mobility is currently employed at the FBI, where agents 
 
 174. See Editorial, Regional Public Defender’s Office Has Worked Well, LUBBOCK 
AVALANCHE-J., Dec. 10, 2008 (describing the West Texas Regional Public Defender Office that 
was created with the support of sixty-five counties and noting that the office has been a success 
“[b]ecause the sole focus is capital cases, [and] the staff is able to get to work immediately on a 
case and spend a lot of time preparing for it”). 
 175. See Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty: 
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 941, 945–46 (1994) (discussing how some elected district attorneys highlight capital 
convictions in their campaign literature); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial 
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 155 (2004) (same). 
 176. John R. Kroger, Remarks: Enron and Multi-Jurisdictional Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1657, 1660 (2007) (explaining that the Enron Task Force “grabbed prosecutors from all over the 
country–Chicago, Boston, Orange County, New York, San Francisco”). In the Enron case the 
nationwide task force model was troublesome because prosecutors were asked to temporarily 
relocate across the country, not to permanently take up a new job for a long period of time. This 
led to frequent turnover. Id. This approach can be avoided at the statewide level because lawyers 
will be taking permanent or at least long-term positions. 
 177. Oregon Department of Justice, Biography of Attorney General John Kroger, 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/ag_bio.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 178. Mary Flood, Task Force Enjoys Post-Enron Success, HOUSTON CHRON., June 2, 2008, at 
1. 
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are often asked to relocate to more prestigious and career-enhancing 
jobs.179 
A fourth reason to join the statewide capital unit would be the 
added compensation that the legislature should provide. Prosecutors 
do not take their positions for the money, and many defense attorneys 
also are not primarily concerned with salary. However, if lawyers are 
still permitted to practice in an area about which they are passionate, 
extra compensation may be a draw.180 Legislatures should be willing 
to increase the salary for elite death penalty lawyers because, as 
explained in Part III.A below, enormous savings can be realized later 
in truncated appeals and habeas corpus petitions. Finally, although it 
would not be politically popular, it is essential that there be salary 
parity between prosecutors and defense lawyers in order to attract 
high quality defense lawyers.181 
III. WHY A STATEWIDE SYSTEM WOULD ACTUALLY SAVE MONEY AND 
DEPOLITICIZE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
There are a multitude of problems with capital punishment in 
the United States, ranging from racial discrimination to wrongful 
conviction. A statewide death penalty cannot cure all of these ills, but 
it can be expected to have numerous benefits. Two are particularly 
worthy of discussion. A statewide system staffed by elite lawyers and 
judges at trial would help to reallocate more funding to the early 
stages of death penalty cases, rather than focusing enormous state 
funding on appeals. In this respect, a statewide approach could be less 
costly for states than the current system, while simultaneously 
reducing problems such as wrongful convictions and racial 
 
 179. The FBI’s website explains that “all Special Agents are subject to transfer at any time 
to meet the organizational and program needs of the FBI. Special Agents accept the possibility of 
transfer as a condition of their employment.” Federal Bureau of Investigations, Special Agent 
Career Path Program, http://www.fbijobs.gov/113.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); see also KURT 
EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT 32–33 (2000) (detailing the inner workings of the FBI’s 
investigation of Archer Daniels Midland and discussing how some of the key agents had 
relocated from across the country).  
 180. See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
441, 442 (2009) (arguing for financial rewards to “attract and retain the best candidates and also 
encourage those who are already prosecutors to perform better”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for 
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 879 (1995) (“Significant evidence indicates that the behavior of 
prosecutors could be affected by financial incentives.”).  
 181. See James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 
328, 337 (2002) (recognizing inadequate compensation of capital defense attorneys as a limiting 
factor in the quality of representation in capital cases and advocating parity between defense 
and prosecution resources). 
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discrimination. Second, the use of elite lawyers would restore faith in 
the death penalty system. This would help to depoliticize the death 
penalty by eliminating many arguments of proponents (who see too 
much attention focused on appeals) and opponents (who criticize the 
shabby defense representation and arbitrary prosecutorial discretion 
afforded under the current system). 
A. Reducing Costs and Providing for More Efficient Capital 
Punishment 
The most obvious objection to a statewide capital punishment 
system is that it would be expensive. While some states do provide 
occasional supplemental funding to counties for “extraordinary” cases, 
for the most part states do not fund capital trials.182 Accordingly, 
moving to a statewide death penalty system would cost states huge 
sums that were previously funded by counties. Although it might be 
nice for states to invest heavily in the important life-or-death 
decisions made at capital trials, there are countless other matters on 
which states could focus their criminal justice spending.183 For 
instance, it would be worthwhile to have more state-funded drug 
programs, crime prevention programs, or organized crime task 
forces.184 Because money is limited and states have countless other 
priorities, there is good reason why states should not volunteer to take 
on large capital trial expenditures.185 
While the cost criticism may seem compelling, it is ultimately 
flawed. Most states that authorize capital punishment already spend 
huge sums of state money on capital cases. While counties typically 
 
 182. See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (“Many public services are 
underfunded, including foster care, medical care, indigent defense, and public schools.”). 
 184. See James R. Acker, Be Careful What You Ask For: Lessons from New York’s Recent 
Experience with Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 719 n.155 (2008) (citing testimony of 
various criminal justice experts on other uses for funds currently spent on death penalty cases). 
 185. Indeed, costs have been a major reason why states have recently considered abolishing 
the death penalty. See Ian Urbina, In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (discussing legislative efforts to repeal the death penalty in 
Maryland, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, and New Hampshire in part based on the economic 
expense of capital cases). Costs played a role in New Jersey’s recent abolition of the death 
penalty. See NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 31–34 (2007), available at 
www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf (recommending abolition in large part based on 
the costs); Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, then Commutes Sentences of 
8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3 (discussing New Jersey’s abolition of the death penalty). In 
tight fiscal times, it is hard to imagine states volunteering to spend huge sums of additional 
money. 
 (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2010 7:08 PM 
346 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:2:307 
fund trials, many states foot the bill for appeals and habeas corpus 
challenges to death sentences,186 and these post-trial proceedings are 
very expensive.187 The question therefore should not be whether states 
would have to outlay large sums of money to create a statewide unit to 
handle the trial of all capital cases. Rather, the relevant question 
should be whether a statewide trial unit would save states money over 
time by reducing the huge costs of capital appeals and habeas 
petitions. There are at least three reasons to answer that question in 
the affirmative. 
1. Fewer Reversals Means Fewer Retrials, Fewer Subsequent Appeals, 
and Lower Costs 
First, if a case is tried by the best prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, the case is less likely to be reversed on appeal. This would 
eliminate the costs of retrial (which would have been borne by the 
counties under the system currently in place in most jurisdictions), 
and it would eliminate the costs of all the appeals following the retrial. 
Given that these appeals run for years and cost hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, the state will save huge sums of money on the back end.  
For instance, in December 2008, the Supreme Court heard oral 
argument in Cone v. Bell, a death penalty case that raised a technical 
question about federal courts’ ability to reconsider state court 
findings.188 According to one observer, Justice Scalia began the 
argument “incredulous that lawyers were at it again” and asked, “How 
long has this case been going on?”189 Justice Scalia no doubt 
remembered Cone’s case, which the Supreme Court had reversed 
twice since his initial death sentence in 1984.190 In the 2008 oral 
argument, Cone’s lawyer made a compelling argument that his case 
should be reversed a third time because the local county prosecutor 
who tried the case had suppressed favorable evidence.191 The county 
prosecutors did not argue in their defense. It was left to the Deputy 
Attorney General, a state employee utilizing state resources, to try to 
 
 186. Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 864. 
 187. See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE COST OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN MARYLAND 2 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411625.html 
(finding that a Maryland death penalty case cost $1.9 million more than a non-death case and 
that about 30 percent of the added cost is attributable to post-trial costs). 
 188. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2009). 
 189. Robert Barnes, Justices Question Withholding of Evidence in Capital Case, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 10, 2008, at A2. 
 190. Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Misconduct in Tennessee Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
10, 2008, at A26. 
 191. Id. 
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preserve the case on appeal.192 Although she fought admirably, the 
Deputy Attorney General was forced repeatedly to concede that the 
local trial prosecutors failed to turn over favorable evidence and that 
their arguments to the jury “overstated” their case.193 Had the case 
been tried by an elite team of prosecutors, the misconduct would 
probably not have occurred, thus saving years of appeals and millions 
of dollars in state-funded appellate costs. 
A simple numerical example illustrates the multiple ways by 
which elite statewide capital trial units would save costs on appeal. 
Assume that under the current capital punishment system, five out of 
ten cases are reversed on appeal, and that when those cases are 
retried, they result in five new death sentences.194 Those five new 
death sentences will be the subject of five new sets of appeals. In total, 
then, the state will be responsible for defending fifteen cases on appeal 
(the original ten appeals and the extra five following retrials). Now 
imagine a system using an elite group of prosecutors and defense 
lawyers that tries the cases with full knowledge of the law and an eye 
toward avoiding reversal. Such lawyers will be far less likely to 
purposefully or inadvertently hide favorable evidence. To be 
conservative, imagine that four out of ten death sentences are 
reversed on appeal and subsequently retried. The state will now be 
responsible for only fourteen appeals rather than fifteen. The cost 
savings in avoiding just one set of appeals will be considerable.195  
However, an elite prosecution unit would eliminate far more 
than this one set of appeals. Utilizing an elite prosecution unit to 
make capital charging decisions would likely reduce the number of 
marginal cases in which prosecutors seek the death penalty in the 
first place, thus reducing the number of death verdicts that states 
would have to defend on appeal. Because county prosecutors reap 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Professor Liebman’s study from 1973–1995 found a 68 percent reversal rate. LIEBMAN 
ET AL., supra note 8, at 8. Given the difficulty of prevailing under the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act and a more conservative federal judiciary, the reversal rate is likely 
considerably lower today. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Violence and the Truth, 76 IND. L.J. 939, 946 
(2001) (criticizing the Liebman study for assuming a constant error rate over time which “is not a 
safe assumption, especially in federal habeas, where reversal rates have been dropping as the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment law has gradually begun to stabilize”). On the 
increasing difficulty of prevailing under the AEDPA, see John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” 
and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 284 (2006). 
 195. See, e.g., Lise Olsen, State Fund Doesn’t Provide Much Relief from Case Costs; Despite 
Promises, State Fund Doesn’t Provide Much Relief from Case Expenses, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 8, 2001, at A8 (“In a single resentencing last year, Thurston County spent 
$1.1 million as it attempted to put double-killer Mitchell Rupe back on death row nineteen years 
after his original conviction.”). 
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political benefits from being tough on crime but do not typically have 
to pay for expensive appeals, they have an incentive to seek the death 
penalty in marginal cases that may be hard to defend on appeal.196 An 
elite group of state prosecutors may choose not to seek the death 
penalty in such marginal cases, thus reducing the number of capital 
prosecutions.197 And because it is very possible that the marginal 
death penalty case would be reversed on appeal and retried, state 
prosecutors would be spared having to defend that case on appeal not 
once, but twice.  
In the hypothetical example above, state prosecutors would 
eliminate three sets of death penalty appeals. In practice, the number 
could well be higher. Because each capital case involves multiple 
levels of direct and collateral review, eliminating multiple sets of 
death penalty appeals potentially would save millions of dollars in 
appellate costs. (And this is to say nothing of the savings at trials 
because the cases will not have to be retried.) These savings in turn 
may fund a substantial portion of the elite statewide capital trial 
units. 
2. Better Trial Lawyers Means Less Time Spent on Non-Meritorious 
Issues on Appeal 
Utilizing an elite team of trial lawyers would also reduce the 
number of non-meritorious claims that presently consume the time of 
appellate judges, law clerks, appellate prosecutors, and appointed 
defense lawyers. Presently, death row inmates litigate dozens of issues 
on appeal and post-conviction review. Two of the most common issues 
are Brady challenges (arguing that prosecutors withheld favorable 
evidence) and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.198 While neither 
type of claim would be eliminated by implementing a statewide death 
 
 196. See Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 877 (“Under the current system, prosecutors who 
procure death sentences are rewarded with good publicity, promotions, and perhaps even with 
judicial office. By contrast, those same prosecutors suffer little stigma when death sentences are 
reversed on appeal because many years have gone by . . . and the public’s attention has moved on 
to new death penalty cases.”). 
 197. Of course, state prosecutors will still have to defend a non-death verdict on appeal. 
However, such cases will be cheaper to defend because, unlike death-penalty cases, non-death 
cases typically do not carry a right of automatic appeal to the state supreme court and the lack of 
a death sentence will remove numerous legal issues that otherwise would have been litigated. 
See ROMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 25 (finding in a 2008 study of Maryland that cases 
resulting in a death sentence cost hundreds of thousands of dollars more at the state appellate 
level than cases where death was not sought). 
 198. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 1108 n.5 (“The three most common species of claims in 
capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson claims, and Brady claims.”). 
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penalty system, both claims would be reduced, and this reduction 
would result in significant cost savings. 
First consider Brady claims. To state a successful Brady claim, 
the prisoner must demonstrate that the government failed to turn 
over evidence that was not only favorable but also material,199 
meaning evidence that would create a reasonable probability of 
changing the outcome.200 In the current system, there are very few 
prosecutors who would knowingly withhold impeachment or 
exculpatory evidence that could reasonably be expected to change the 
outcome of a defendant’s capital case.201 Thus, transitioning to a 
statewide unit would not accomplish much in these situations.  
However, prosecutors often may accidentally fail to turn over 
marginal evidence, and these more frequent occurrences might lead 
defendants to allege unsuccessful Brady violations. Prosecutors who 
are not well trained or lack death penalty experience may, with the 
purest of motives, fail to turn over potential Brady material simply 
because they did not realize it should have been disclosed. For 
example, in a case where multiple witnesses saw the defendant kill 
the victim, the prosecution may neglect to disclose to the defendant 
that one of the witnesses had a prior conviction for theft or that he 
initially stated the wrong time of the offense.202 This impeachment 
evidence is favorable and should be turned over to the defendant, 
though it is exceedingly unlikely that an appellate court would reverse 
a conviction or death sentence when there are multiple additional 
witnesses tying the defendant to the crime. 
Nevertheless, because the good faith of the prosecutor is not 
relevant to whether a Brady violation occurred,203 prosecutors cannot 
simply dispose of Brady claims by saying that they acted with pure 
motives. Rather, any potential Brady violation must be briefed by 
prosecutors and defense lawyers. And briefing is expensive. Due to the 
complexity of the law under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme 
Court estimated that the size of appellate briefs in death penalty cases 
 
 199. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 200. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“The evidence is material only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 201. Gershowitz, supra note 144, at 1061–62. 
 202. See Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1111–15 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing how 
prosecutor failed to disclose that state witness in a capital case had several traffic charges that 
prosecutor helped to resolve but that were not material for Brady purposes).  
 203. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
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increased from 50 to 250 pages between 1990 and 2000.204 Such briefs 
take upwards of three thousand hours of attorney time to draft.205 
Appellate judges also spend significant time reviewing these briefs 
and drafting opinions. The matter might then be remanded to the trial 
court to hold a hearing and find further facts.206 At the end of the day, 
because the materiality standard for a successful Brady claim is 
onerous,207 the prisoner is likely to lose. But not before the state is 
forced to spend a substantial amount of money to fight the non-
meritorious claim. 
An elite team of prosecutors that focuses exclusively on 
handling capital cases is much more likely to prevent non-meritorious 
Brady claims.  These prosecutors would know to disclose evidence that 
is arguably favorable to the defendant. Thus, prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and appellate judges (and possibly trial judges on remand) 
would not have to spend valuable time and money litigating issues 
that, while sufficiently plausible to provoke an appeal, would 
ultimately be resolved against the defendant.208  
Indeed, elite prosecutors could likely conduct “cleaner”209 trials 
than less experienced local prosecutors on a host of issues similar to 
Brady claims. Highly trained capital prosecutors could avoid claims 
that inadmissible evidence was offered,210 that admissible evidence 
was excluded,211 or that inappropriate arguments were made to the 
 
 204. RICHARD P. GUY, STATUS REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON STATE 10 
(2000), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/deathpenalty/deathpenalty.pdf.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 11 (“Washington Supreme Court review not infrequently results in additional 
trial level hearings in the county where the case originated.”). 
 207. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (clarifying the materiality 
standard); Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1450, 1455 (2006) (noting that Brady violations are rarely identified and that “even when 
[prisoners] do their convictions are rarely overturned because they face a tremendous burden on 
appeal”). 
 208. See Liebman, supra note 181, at 339 (recognizing that procedural roadblocks to habeas 
review add litigation time and that reducing litigation would best be accomplished “by 
eliminating altogether the most frequently litigated habeas claims”). Professor Liebman has 
proposed that states ensure improved trial and direct appellate review in exchange for death row 
prisoners foregoing substantial amounts of habeas review. Id. at 334. To date, states have not 
embraced this very logical proposal. 
 209. No case is perfect. By “cleaner,” I mean a trial that leaves open far fewer grounds for a 
defendant’s appeal. 
 210. See, e.g., Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 659–60 (Ky. 2003) (concluding in a 
death penalty case that the trial court admitted inappropriate character evidence but that it was 
harmless). 
 211. See State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 519 (Mo. 2004) (considering in capital case whether 
excluded letter from defendant’s grandmother amounted to mitigating evidence, but finding that 
it was cumulative and therefore harmless); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 959–60 (Fla. 2003) 
(concluding that the trial court should have admitted letters showing co-defendant’s domination 
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jury.212 Although each of these examples constitutes viable legal 
issues, these issues are rarely successful on appeal.213 Thus, they 
consume time to brief and argue but are very unlikely to be resolved in 
the defendant’s favor. Put simply, the better the prosecutors, the less 
opportunity the defendant has to raise time-consuming and ultimately 
unsuccessful legal claims on appeal and post-conviction review.  
Of course, the counterargument exists that proactively 
eliminating the defendant’s non-meritorious arguments only goes so 
far. Critics might argue that a defendant can always find something to 
point to in order to challenge his conviction and death sentence on 
appeal. While that may be true, there is a big difference between a 
reasonable challenge that ultimately proves to be unsuccessful (such 
as the ones suggested above) and one so frivolous that it does not pass 
the laugh test (and can thus be easily disposed of by a court). Defense 
attorneys are ethically forbidden from raising frivolous issues on 
appeal214 and would risk sanctions by doing so.215 And while prisoners 
are free to file their own briefs raising issues, courts would not likely 
devote significant time and attention to those issues when defense 
attorneys are unwilling to raise the issues themselves.216  
In sum, while it is impossible to eliminate all issues on appeal 
(and, indeed, defense lawyers are obligated to file Anders briefs when 
 
over the defendant but finding that the error was harmless because it could not outweigh the five 
aggravating factors, including that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated fashion). 
 212. See Williams v. State, 188 P.3d 208, 230 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding that 
prosecutor’s argument to jury that they would devalue victim’s life by giving less than a death 
sentence was improper but nevertheless harmless error); Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1062 
(Fla. 2007) (finding that the prosecutor’s improper argument that the jury should give the 
defendant the same mercy that defendant showed to the victim was harmless error); Duncan v. 
State, No. 05-00-01773-CR, 2002 WL 1611848, at *2 (Tex. App. July 23, 2002) (finding that 
multiple inappropriate references to defendant’s parole eligibility if he did not receive a death 
sentence was harmless error). 
 213. See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible 
Error, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894–95 (1992) (concluding that reversal for evidentiary reasons 
is rare). 
 214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous . . . .”). 
 215. See Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45 
HOUSTON L. REV. 747, 748 n.3 (2008) (collecting cases in which appellate counsel were 
sanctioned for filing frivolous claims). 
 216. See A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating 
Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1997) (“The onslaught of frivolous 
appeals unleashed by Anders has driven the courts to a system of judicial triage. Confronted with 
ever-increasing numbers of appeals, courts have adopted screening mechanisms to sort out cases 
warranting close judicial attention from those appropriate for summary rejection.”). 
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there is no viable legal issue),217 it is possible to reduce dramatically 
the time that prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, clerks, and court 
staff spend on non-meritorious claims. A proactive elite team of 
prosecutors can therefore reduce appellate costs. 
The same logic applies with even greater force to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. The most common allegation in post-
conviction death penalty cases is that the defendant did not receive 
adequate counsel.218 Too often, defendants have valid or at least 
colorable claims to support their ineffectiveness allegations. When 
these claims are indeed valid, the death sentences (and perhaps also 
the underlying convictions) should be reversed.219 But, once again, 
reversals are very much the exception, not the rule.220 Defendants 
consume enormous amounts of court time with ineffectiveness 
challenges by submitting supporting documentation and voluminous 
briefs that require prosecutors to make responsive filings and force 
judges to review all of the materials and issue factual findings. Judges 
in the Sixth Circuit have accused some defense counsel of sandbagging 
in capital cases so as to create ineffectiveness claims and delay the 
time between conviction and execution.221 In the vast majority of 
cases, however, all the time and money is for naught because the 
claims are rejected. 
Now imagine that instead of your average local public 
defender, the defendant was represented by an elite lawyer from the 
 
 217. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (providing that counsel must file a brief 
stating that she has reviewed the record carefully and identify the legal issues she believes are 
frivolous but that an appellate court might determine to be non-frivolous before the attorney will 
be permitted to withdraw as counsel on direct appeal); see Newton, supra note 215, at 757 
(explaining that “the federal courts of appeals have continued to require Anders-type ‘no merit’ 
briefs in federal appeals”). 
 218. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 114 (2008) (“Studies of 
postconviction filings show that ineffective assistance of counsel is the most commonly raised 
claim during appeals.”). 
 219. I am in agreement with critics who maintain that it is too difficult to demonstrate a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that the standard should be changed. See, 
e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (“The courts should broaden their focus 
to concentrate on the fairness of the proceedings rather than the absence of identifiable errors by 
defense counsel.”). 
 220. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2068 (2000) (“It is thus exceedingly difficult to win a claim 
under the standard established in Strickland.”).  
 221. See Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 588 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, C.J., concurring) 
(“If counsel provides fully-effective assistance, and the jury simply does not buy the defense, then 
the defendant is likely to be executed. However, if counsel provides ineffective assistance, then 
the prisoner is likely to be spared, certainly for many years, and frequently forever.”). For an 
analysis of whether sandbagging would be good strategy, see Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective 
Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1675–80 (2008). 
1b. Gershowitz_ Page (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2010 7:08 PM 
2010] STATEWIDE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 353 
statewide capital punishment unit. Unlike some local death penalty 
attorneys, that lawyer has a decade of felony experience, at least five 
death penalty cases under her belt, and no successful ineffective 
assistance challenges against her. Also imagine that the defense 
lawyer was hand-selected by the state attorney general based on 
interviews with her colleagues and judges from around the state.222 
Although these elite defense attorneys would inevitably still be the 
subject of some ineffective assistance challenges, the number of claims 
would likely decrease by a substantial margin. Even if ineffectiveness 
claims are still filed, appellate judges would have confidence that most 
are frivolous, and they would likely devote considerably less attention 
and resources to them. Put simply, with elite defense lawyers 
handling cases at trial, expensive but marginal ineffectiveness claims 
would be less prevalent and time-consuming on appeal, thus saving 
time and money. 
3. Requiring Counties to Contribute Money to States for Capital 
Cases, Rather than Vice Versa 
Under the current system, most funding for capital trials is 
provided by counties.223 In some states, however, the counties receive 
supplemental assistance from the state treasury. For instance, under 
Washington State’s Extraordinary Criminal Justice Act, counties can 
apply to the state for reimbursement of the costs of aggravated 
murder cases.224 Unfortunately, the program has not managed to put 
much money in the hands of counties.225 The state of Indiana is much 
more generous and reimburses 50 percent of indigent defense costs.226 
Most impressively, the state of Illinois created a Capital Litigation 
 
 222. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing proposed qualifications for capital defense 
lawyers). 
 223. Vick, supra note 112, at 394. 
 224. GUY, supra note 204, at 8.  
 225. See WASHINGTON DEATH PENALTY ASSISTANCE CTR., WASHINGTON’S DEATH PENALTY 
SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF THE COSTS, LENGTH AND RESULTS OF CAPITAL CASES IN WASHINGTON 
STATE 11, 13 (2004) (explaining that a substantial amount of state money has ended up being 
sent to large counties and to non-death penalty cases); Olsen, supra note 195 (“In the first year of 
the program, counties asked for $4.5 million; the Legislature has set aside only $550,000.”); 
Report: State Rarely Aids Counties With Murder-Case Costs: 3 Out of 4 Requests Denied; 
Defendants’ Legal Bills Usually Paid By Public, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at B2 (explaining 
that only one county received assistance and only a fraction of what it requested). 
 226. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 815 (2004); see also Editorial, The Cost to Execute, 
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Oct. 18, 2006, at A10 (“Counties can be reimbursed for up to 50 
percent of costs.”). 
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Trust Fund that provides substantial supplemental funding (though 
not full reimbursement) for death penalty trials.227 
If states were to assume responsibility for prosecuting death 
penalty cases, this model would be inverted. Counties could be asked 
to provide a modest amount of funding when states take over their 
cases and seek the death penalty. States would have discretion in how 
much they asked counties to pay. Larger counties could be called on to 
pay more than medium-sized counties. Small counties could be 
exempted altogether. States could also adopt a more complicated 
approach that tied the county’s obligation to whether it requested that 
the state seek the death penalty. For instance, counties could be asked 
to pay for 20 percent of the costs of trial. However, if the county had 
filed a memorandum advocating that the defendant face death, the 
county’s share of the costs could be increased to 30 percent.228 Either 
scenario would amount to a substantial windfall for the county 
because even with a more expensive elite team of statewide lawyers, 
the county would still pay less than if it had handled the case itself. 
There are various other approaches states could utilize to seek 
reimbursement from counties. The key point, however, is that the 
state could seek to make up some of the money it is expending to try 
the cases. Together with the savings on appellate costs, the 
supplementation from the counties may help states break even or 
reduce their total costs. 
* * * 
In sum, there is good reason to believe that the costs of a 
statewide capital trial unit could be offset from savings on appeals. 
Elite prosecutors would exercise their charging discretion more 
carefully and handle trials more effectively, thus reducing the number 
of appeals that states would have to fund. And because of their skills 
and reputations, elite prosecutors and defense lawyers would reduce 
the time and money the death penalty system currently spends on 
non-meritorious claims. Finally, to the extent there is a shortfall, 
counties could be asked to contribute a portion of the trial costs they 
would have paid if they had handled the trial. 
 
 227. Hayler, supra note 128, at 435–36. 
 228. By contrast, if the county recommended against seeking death and the statewide 
prosecutors chose to do so anyway, the county’s obligation could be dropped to 10 percent of the 
trial costs. From a financial perspective, counties therefore would have an incentive to oppose 
capital charges. Yet, they could not do so vocally because it would be politically unpalatable to be 
on record opposing the death penalty in gruesome cases. 
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B. Depoliticizing the Death Penalty through an Elite Group of Lawyers 
Assuming a statewide capital punishment system would cost 
roughly the same amount of money as the current system, if not less, 
the final question is whether such an approach would be beneficial. To 
answer this question, it is worth taking a moment to put the flaws of 
the current death penalty system in perspective.  
As almost every observer knows, there are numerous problems 
with the implementation of capital punishment in the United States: 
racial discrimination, geographic arbitrariness, underfunded defense 
lawyers, and wrongful convictions, to name just a few.229 These are 
serious problems, and scholars are certainly justified in proposing 
remedies for them. The proposed remedies, however, often tend to be 
more procedural protections and greater appellate review.230 
Unfortunately, these remedies tend to aggravate the other problem 
with capital punishment that often goes unrecognized by academics: 
the frequent reversals of convictions and sentences and the 
concomitantly long delay in carrying out executions. Proponents of 
capital punishment complain, sometimes with good reason, that the 
death penalty system is bogged down by needless legal wrangling that 
results in decades of delay for defendants who deserve death under 
states’ laws. Opponents respond that without the long and careful 
review, wrongful death sentences, including execution of the innocent, 
would be carried out. And so we are often left at stalemate. The death 
penalty remains highly politicized,231 with proponents and opponents 
alike suspicious of reform proposals.232 
Obviously, abolitionists will never be satisfied with simply 
fixing the death penalty system to make it more equitable. Fervent 
 
 229. See generally DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON 
AMERICA’S DEATH ROW (2005) (chronicling the systemic problems with capital punishment); 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 359 (1995) (questioning 
why the Supreme Court’s regulation of capital punishment has been “so messy and so 
meaningless”). 
 230. See Liebman, supra note 92, at 2136 (“Most proposals for curing [the ills of capital 
punishment] are doomed to make it worse. Typically, those proposals aim merely to treat one or 
another procedural symptom at either the stern or the stem, without attacking the disease itself 
(the skewed incentive system) or its principal substantive symptom (the overproduction of 
death).”). 
 231. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 
285 (2008) (explaining how the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence allowed the death 
penalty to become highly politicized). 
 232. See Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First Century 
Punishment Realities, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 12 (2008) (noting that legal reformers’ 
“advocacy is likely to grate on those not categorically opposed to the punishment of death”). 
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supporters of capital punishment will not find it acceptable to 
marginally decrease, rather than greatly reduce, appeals and 
reversals. Recognizing that these two polar opposites will never agree 
to a modest reform proposal, the question then is whether those 
interested in reforming the existing system can find merit in a 
statewide capital punishment system. The answer should be 
affirmative because the existence of an elite statewide capital 
punishment unit would restore confidence in the system and likely 
improve accuracy, while limiting appeals and reducing reversals. In 
short, there is something for both sides of the debate. 
First, an elite statewide unit staffed by the best prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and judges should help to ensure that the most 
culpable defendants are the ones who will be sentenced to death. Elite 
prosecutors who focus exclusively on death penalty cases would have a 
better sense of who is truly deserving of death than county prosecutors 
who only occasionally handle capital cases. And because the state 
would pay the bill, rather than cash-strapped counties, money should 
play no role in deciding which defendants face death.233 This 
consequence alone should amount to a dramatic improvement over the 
current system. Furthermore, because the race of the victim and the 
defendant would be redacted from the charging committee’s file, bias 
would be reduced, if not eliminated completely.234 Thereafter, once the 
defendant is on trial for her life, her sentence would not be based on 
the lottery of which defense lawyer she receives.235 Because all cases 
would be handled by elite defense lawyers, we can be sure that when a 
defendant is sentenced to death it is because she deserved it, not 
because she had a lousy lawyer.236 Relatedly, because defense lawyers 
would be funded at the state level with resources equivalent to 
prosecutors, we can be sure that the death sentence was not the 
 
 233. See Liebman, supra note 181, at 328 (recognizing inadequate compensation of capital 
defense attorneys as a limiting factor in the quality of representation in capital cases).  
 234. See Little, supra note 162, at 412 (describing how, in federal death-penalty cases, the 
Justice Department “self-consciously eliminates racial information from the Attorney General’s 
review process”). 
 235. See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery–Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in 
Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 
685 (1990) (“In practice, however, the system for imposing capital punishment is most often a 
game of chance in which the winners and losers are distinguished not by their criminal and 
moral culpability, but by the luck of the lawyers they draw.”). 
 236. See Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of 
Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 163 (2006) (arguing 
that “too many defense attorneys lack the kind of training and professional experience that is 
needed to find and develop th[e] humanizing testimony” that is necessary to separate the truly 
death-worthy). 
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product of a resource deficit.237 An elite statewide capital punishment 
unit can provide assurance that the defendant received a fair shake 
during the charging process and at trial.238 
Second, an elite capital punishment unit should reduce the 
possibility of convicting (and later executing) innocent defendants. 
Statewide prosecutors would be under less pressure than local district 
attorneys to achieve convictions and death sentences for high-profile 
crimes.239 They would therefore be less likely to push the envelope and 
seek death when there is a plausible claim that the defendant might 
be innocent.240 More importantly, because a statewide system would 
provide every defendant with a highly qualified and adequately 
funded defense attorney, the risk of a wrongful conviction should be 
dramatically reduced. Quite simply, good lawyering at trial, not years 
of habeas proceedings, is the best defense against a wrongful 
execution.241 Additionally, because each prosecutor would be carefully 
vetted to select only those with sterling ethical reputations, it is highly 
unlikely that the defendant would be prosecuted by an overly 
aggressive lawyer willing to cut corners and risk a wrongful 
conviction. 
Third, an elite statewide unit would reduce the number of 
plausible and frivolous appellate claims that defendants could raise. 
Defendants represented by elite lawyers would be unable to allege 
plausible ineffective assistance of counsel claims.242 Likewise, elite 
prosecutors would steer clear of most Brady claims, as well as 
 
 237. Id. at 164 (“[D]efense attorneys in many jurisdictions are overmatched and outspent by 
experienced prosecutors who have the state’s considerable resources at their disposal. This 
disparity in resources increases the likelihood that wrongful condemnations will occur in death 
penalty cases.”). 
 238. As Professor David Dow has argued, the issue of innocence in death penalty cases often 
distracts courts and observers from the numerous other problems with the system that deny 
defendants a fair trial. David R. Dow, Death By Good Intentions, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2006, at 
B7. 
 239. See Michael Hall, Death Isn’t Fair, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 122 (noting that 
district attorneys consider “how much publicity the case is getting” in deciding whether or not to 
seek the death penalty). 
 240. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 475 (1996) (“Erroneous convictions . . . may occur 
disproportionately often in capital cases for two types of reasons: (1) Because of factors that are 
common or inevitable in capital prosecutions, but that occur in other cases as well—for instance, 
the fact that the crime involves homicide, or that it was heavily publicized; (2) Because of 
consequences that flow from the demand for the death penalty itself.”). 
 241. Id. at 496 (“Other things being equal, higher quality representation will decrease the 
likelihood of conviction, and may operate as a check on errors and misconduct that drive some 
innocent capital defendants to trial and to conviction.”). 
 242. See supra notes 218–222 and accompanying text. 
 (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2010 7:08 PM 
358 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:2:307 
incorrect jury instructions and evidentiary errors.243 This would serve 
to eliminate some (though not all) of the defendants’ appellate issues. 
In turn, there should be fewer reversals on appeal, fewer remands for 
evidentiary hearings, shorter response briefs for government lawyers 
to draft, and fewer legal issues for appellate judges to decide.244 The 
cost savings would be enormous, and the time from conviction to 
execution would be greatly shortened. 
However, the greatest benefit of an elite statewide death 
penalty unit may be intangible. The problems with capital 
punishment—particularly wrongful convictions—have shaken faith in 
the legal system.245 A statewide death penalty system staffed by elite 
lawyers could help to restore confidence in the system. With an elite 
capital unit in place, wrongful convictions should decrease, and 
reversal rates for clearly guilty defendants should lessen. There 
should be fewer alarming news stories about atrocious defense 
lawyers and overly aggressive prosecutors. The elite capital unit 
should be able to carry out its work without it being politicized. While 
the crimes themselves will continue to be news stories, the criminal 
justice process should fade into a less prominent place in the 
background. 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly two decades ago, Professor Vivian Berger explained 
that just as we would not allow chiropractors to conduct brain surgery 
simply because a town has no brain surgeons, we should not permit 
inadequate criminal lawyers to handle capital cases simply because 
they are the only lawyers available.246 In this Article, I have argued 
that even having competent lawyers handling capital cases is not 
sufficient. Specialists are needed. The death penalty system should be 
staffed by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges who are not only 
 
 243. See supra notes 199–213 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2008) 
(recognizing that stories of exonerations “convey a mixed message to the American public [and] 
demonstrate that the system is flawed – that the police occasionally arrest the wrong people, 
that prosecutors charge them with crimes, and that judges and juries fail them” but also lead 
some to argue that “the post-conviction process serves an effective corrective function”). 
 246. Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 254 (1990–1991) (citing Minority Report of Stephen B. 
Bright, in TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY 
CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS 
CORPUS app. at A-46 (1989)). 
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exceptional lawyers but who are willing to devote their attention 
exclusively to capital cases.  
By using specialists, the system can reduce the number of 
reversals and thereby cut the costs of capital cases. Relying on highly 
skilled and ethical trial lawyers can transfer more of the costs of the 
death penalty from the appellate end of capital cases—where they do 
little good—and place them at the trial stage. Such an approach would 
not only reduce the costs and length of appeal, but it would also 
restore faith in the system and hopefully reduce the likelihood of 
wrongful convictions. 
Because most counties are far too small to staff an elite unit of 
capital prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges, a statewide approach 
is necessary. Handling death penalty cases at the state level would 
have the benefit of not just a wider pool of talent, but also the ability 
to equalize capital cases across the state. At present, some counties 
lack the resources to seek the death penalty even when the defendant 
truly deserves it, while other counties have the financial ability to 
seek the death penalty even in marginal cases. The geographic 
arbitrariness of the death penalty could be greatly minimized by 
utilizing a centralized charging system in which the same small group 
of prosecutors reviews all cases in which death is a potential 
punishment. If all capital cases are handled by an elite group of state 
prosecutors, there will be a constant group of attorneys to make 
capital charging decisions without regard to money.  
An elite statewide unit of capital lawyers will not solve all of 
the problems with the death penalty. However, it could go far toward 
improving the quality of defense counsel, reducing prosecutorial 
misconduct, equalizing charging across the state, shifting 
expenditures from appeals to trials, reducing the risk of convicting the 
innocent, shortening the delay between conviction and execution, and 
generally restoring confidence in the death penalty system. 
 
 
